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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress adopted a statute requiring financial institutions
to report cash transactions over $10,000 to the government. 1 Failure
to report was a crime. 2 In 1987, Congress made it a crime to structure
financial transactions to evade this reporting law. Thus, for example,
if Joe arranges his banking so the cash transactions are below $10,000
in order to avoid reporting, Joe commits a federal crime. What brought
Congress to this point? Should we be alarmed at the extent of governmental intrusion into the arrangement of our financial affairs, or
is the intrusion warranted? This article answers these questions and
tells a good story as well.
The story begins with money laundering. Part II provides background on money laundering and describes the government's opening
salvo against laundering, a statute requiring financial institutions to
report cash transactions over $10,000 to the government. 3 To skirt
this law, launderers began to conduct multiple cash transactions just
below the $10,000 reporting threshold. The army of persons who scurried from bank to bank to accomplish these transactions became lmown
as "smurfs" because, like their little blue cartoon namesakes, they
were pandemic. Smurfs thrived when the 1970 reporting law encountered trouble in the courts. The government's response to this new
species was to adopt a new criminal provision, the 1987 anti-smurfing
statute. 4
Congress adopted the anti-smurfing statute quickly and without
careful analysis. The legislative history includes examples of problems
with the reporting law5 and descriptions of cases the government lost. 6

1. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 221-23, 84 Stat. 1122 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
5313(a) (1982); 31 C.F.R. § 102.1(b) (1970».
2. Id. §§ 205(b), 209-10, 84 Stat. 1120-21 (1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1980».
3. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1982); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(I) (1988).
4. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986).
5. See The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing
Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 41,
82-83, 89 (1986) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs]; Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering as They Involve Finan-

cial Institutions, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 179-82 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,

1989]
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Yet the history contains little analysis of the elements of this new
crime, 7 and no analysis of its basic theory, constitutionality, interaction
with other reporting laws, or its relationship to federal criminal law
as a whole. The lack of analysis results from several factors. Congress
was in a hurry to plug the loopholes in the reporting statute to halt
the drain of laundered money. 8 Congress resented the insolence of
money launderers, particularly the smurfs who flooded the banks with
multiple transactions for $9900, thereby avoiding the reporting requirement. 9 Finally, the anti-smurfing statute was upstaged, but not
obviated, by legislation making money laundering per se a crime. 10

Finam:e and Urban Affairs]; Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Gomm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Gomm.].
6. See Hearing Before Senate Gomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note
5, at 53-55, 97, 128-35; Hearings Before the House Gomm. on Banking, Finam:e and Urban
Affairs, supra note 5, at 179-82, 846-47, 850; Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Gomm.,
supra note 5, at 224.
7. See Hearing Before the Senate Gomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra
note 5, at 49-50, 61-62,66-68, 115, 136-37; cf. Hearings Before the House Gomm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 5 (extensive analysis of elements of 18 U.S.C. §§
1956-57 (Supp. IV 1986».
8. Congress acted quickly in defining this new crinle. As late as 1985, the reporting law
appeared to present no significant problems. No improvements to the law were suggested in
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING vii-viii (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CONNECTION]. The Department of Justice seemed confident of the bank reporting law in 1983. See
NARCOTIC & DANGEROUS DRUG SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL MONEY LAUNDERING - A GUIDE TO THE BANK
SECRECY ACT 11-16, 99-129 (1983). Also, the cases generally upheld prosecutions until United
States v. AnzaIone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985). But see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, BANK
SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING NEED FOR AMENDMENT (cited in Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 681-82) (identifying aggregation
loophole and recommending amendment). Congress passed the anti-smurfing statute on October
27, 1986; it became effective three months later. Section 1364(a) of Pub.L. 99-570 provided that:
''The amendment made by section 1354 shall apply with respect to transactions for the payment,
receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency or other monetary instrunlents completed
after the end of the 3-month period begimling on the date of the enactment of this Act [October
27, 1986]." Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1364(a), 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). A
gestation period of two years from the time a problem arises until Congress has it solved is short.

9. See Hearing Before the Senate Gomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra
note 5, at 41, 87, 89, 96; Hearings Before the House Gomm. on Banking, Finam:e and Urban
Affairs, supra note 5, at 654, 661; Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Gomm., supra note 5,
at 221-22.
10. See generally Hearing Before the House Gomm. on Banking, Finam:e and Urban
Affairs, supra note 5 (analysis of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (Supp. IV 1986».
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This article takes a thorough look at the anti-smurfing statute.
Following this introduction, part II presents the setting that facilitated
the emergence of smurfs. Part III examines the statute itself, including
its basic theory, elements, constitutionality, unit of prosecution, and
practical operation. Part IV examines how this new crime fits into
federal criminal law as a whole. The article concludes that on balance,
the reduction in privacy that the anti-smurfing statute effects is warranted by the harm money laundering and the drug trade cause.

II.

THE SETTING: CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO
SMURFS

A. Some Background on Money Laundering
Money laundering begins with dirty money. Money can get dirty
in two ways. One way is through tax evasion; people make money
legally, but they make more than they report to the government.l1
Money also gets dirty through illegal generation. 12 Common techniques
include drug sales,13 gambling,14 and bribery.15 Once money is dirty,
it must be converted into an apparently legitimate form, or "laundered"
before it can be invested or spent. 16 '''Money laundering' is the process
by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application
11. See, e.g., United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), em. denied, 479 U.S. 989
(1986); United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), em. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (198.5);
see also United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant claimed his
$185,200 in cash was ''poker winnings"; conceivably he generated it legally, for example in Las
Vegas).
12. Illegally generated money is probably dirty in both ways because after illegal generation
it presumably goes unreported.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1970 CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4396 ("The money in many of these transactions may represent •.. the
proceeds of a lottery racket . . . .").
15. ld. ("The money in many of these transactions may represent ... the bribery of public
officials.").
16. Laundering is only required for large amounts of money because small amounts can be
absorbed inconspicuously. For example, a person legally generating and reporting an income of
$100,000 could probably dispose of half of it in unlaundered cash on items like clothing, cars,
resta1lral).ts, and travel without arousing suspicion. But when vast amounts of money are involved, it cannot simply be absorbed and spent as cash. Often drug trafficking is the crinle
generating the amounts of money that require laundering. See, e.g., Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d
at 1432 (money derived from cocaine trafficking); United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1979) (money to be used to purcltase cocaine); infra text accompanying note 24 ($355
million worth of cocaine seized); see also United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.
1983) (defendant claimed his $185,200 in cash was ''poker winnings," but the court noted that
the defendant had trouble speaking English and that his girlfriend possessed the return portion
of a round-trip airline ticket from Medellin, Columbia to Miami, Florida).
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of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legiti7
mate."'
Laundering has several goals. One is to hide or sanitize the property so the tax collector does not get it. This aspect of the laundering
process has been chronicled in detail.' 8 Another goal is to convert the
cash into a physically manageable and inconspicuous form. That form
often is a postal money order or cashier's check, 19 but it also could be
gold, stamps, or any form of property. The importance of converting
cash into a manageable physical form is illustrated by the case of

Anthony Castelbuono. Castelbuono somewhat conspicuously brought
$1,187,450 in small bills to a casino. The cash had an estimated volume
20
of 5.75 cubic feet and weighed 280 pounds.
Whatever its goal, money laundering is harmful. Underground

money absorbs no portion of the tax burden. More importantly, laundering is harmful because it allows the underlying criminal activity to
thrive. Drug sales, gambling, or other crimes that generate cash are
pointless if the cash cannot be invested or spent. Without laundering,
the risk/reward ratio for the underlying crime is unattractive. Thus,
success of the criminal venture depends on laundering. 21 Efficient laundering renders the underlying crime lucrative, and therefore perpetuates it.

THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 8, at 7.
18. Id. at 13-15, 2949.
19. Postal money orders and cashier's checks are the launderers' instruments of choice.
Unlike property such as cash, gold, and real estate, money orders and cashier's checks are
physically convenient and extremely mobile. They are better than two-party checks because
they are guaranteed and require no underlying bank account. They are better than certified
checks because no payor need be identified. Although banks and the Post Office keep some
records of cashier's checks and money orders, the documentation is minimal. Postal money
orders and cashier's checks are thus the most flexible and anonymous form of property. In fact,
postal money orders became so popular that in August, 1987, the Postal Service imposed a
temporary ceiling on sales of money orders to $10,000 per person per day. See Restriction on
Purchase Money Orders, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,992 (1987).
20. See HearingBefore the Senate JudiciaryComm., supranote 5, at 104; see also Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 656 (drug
trade worth $110 billion per year in "huge bulky quantities of cash in denominations no larger
than $100'.
21. "Money laundering ... provides a function necessary for the effective operation of a
number of types of criminal activities conducted on a large scale." Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 148 (response to questions
17.

by James Knapp and Brian Sun); see also THE CASH CONNECTION, supranote 8, at 3 ('Without

the means to launder money, thereby making cash generated by a criminal enterprise appear
to come from a legitimate source, organized crime could not flourish as it now does.").
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Money laundering has become a major concern recently because
of the thriving drug trade.2 Laundering is required only if large
amounts of cash are involved, because smaller amounts of dirty cash
can be absorbed inconspicuously into a criminal's lifestyle. Huge
amounts of cash require attention to disposal, and the drug trade
currently generates such huge amounts.2 For example, in August
1988, five-thousand pounds of cocaine were seized in New York; the
estimated street value was $355 million.- Had this cocaine reached

the streets, that $355 million would exist originally as cash. To put
that cash to its best use, it would have to be laundered.
Aside from combating these measurable harms, putting a halt to
money laundering also is emotionally appealing. The existence of laundering schemes indicates that some people get rich unfairly because
they pay no taxes. Furthermore, the people who need laundering
schemes often get rich because they sell drugs in the United States.
Drug money laundering is especially unsavory on an intuitive level,
considering the source of the cash that drives it.
B.

The Original Reporting Statute

The government's first attack on money laundering was indirect.
In 1970, Congress passed the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act2 ("the Act") as Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act. 26 The

22. See Restriction on Purchase of Postal Money Orders, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,992 (1987). See
generally Abramovsky, Money-Laundering and Narcotics Prosecution,54 FORDHAM L. REV.
471 (1986) (foreclosing the opportunity to launder drug dollars can substantially decrease the
quantity of drugs imported and sold); Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility
and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1333 ("Importers and [drug]
dealers ... must confront the problem of processing a volume of cash so enormous that it must
be weighed instead of counted, or counted with the aid of high-speed machines. In fact, one
informant claims that getting rid of the money has become the hardest part of the dope business.")
(footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) (money derived
from cocaine trafficking); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) (circumstances led court to conclude cash was raised in drug transactions); United States v.
Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979) (money to be used to purchase cocaine); see also
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at
125 (estimates of drug trade from $50 to $110 billion); Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., supra note 5, at 220 (74 pounds of cocaine worth $30 million); Lexington Herald-Leader,
Mar. 25, 1989, at A3, col. 6 (Detroit cocaine ring generated as much as $3 million per day from
1982 to 1988).
24. See Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 22, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
25. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14, 5316-22 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
26. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1829b, 1951-59 (1982)); id. §§ 5311-14, 5316-22 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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Act imposes reporting requirements for certain financial transactions.2
One statute provides that when a domestic financial institutionZ is
involved in a currency transaction under circumstances prescribed by
regulation, the bank must file a report with the government.2 The
regulations require that banks report each transaction in currency
exceeding $10,000.3 Failure to report can result in civill and criminal32
penalties.
The stated purpose of the Act is to generate reports with a "high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations."
Congress recognized that criminals deal in cash. Thus, large cash

27. Id. See generally Note, The Currency Reporting Laws and the War on Organized
Crime, 20 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1061 (1986) (discussing a financial institution's liability for its
agents' reporting violations and the need for greater deterrence of reporting violations).
28. The reporting law opplies to "domestic financial institutions," which include banks,
securities dealers, currency exchanges, funds transmitters, telegraph companies, casinos, and
anyone subject to state or federal banking authority. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(g) (1988). In this
article the term "bank" is used for convenience, but the law is not so limited.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1982) provides in part: "When a domestic financial institution is
involved in a transaction... of... currency... under circumstances the Secretary prescribes
by regulation, the institution and any other participant in the transaction the Secretary may
prescribe shall file a report ... in the way the Secretary prescribes."
30. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1988). The regulation provides in relevant part: "Each financial
institution ... shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other
payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a transaction
in currency of more than $10,000." Id. Portions of this regulation reflect an amendment effective
April, 1987. Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,442 (1987) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1)
(1988)). The amended regulation is discussed infra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
The form designed for the report is Treasury Form 4789 (Currency Transaction Report).
See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39 n.15 (1974). The form is to be filed with
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(4) (1988). A copy of the form is
reproduced in the Appendix.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1988). The
Secretary and Congress have amended both these provisions several times since adopting them
in 1970. Both 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. IV 1986) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1988) reflect the
progression of amendments in their legislative history sections. The original civil penalty was
limited to not more than $1000; today the same civil penalty for willful violation is limited to
'not more than the greater of the amount (not to exceed $100,000) involved in the transaction
or $25,000." 31 C.F.R. § 103.47(f) (1988).
32. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Like the civil penalty statute, see
supranote 31, this criminal penalty statute has been amended twice since its adoption to increase
the sanctions. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1356(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3207-24, 3207-26 (1986); Pub. L. No.
98473, §901(b), 98 Stat. 2135 (1984). The original penalty was limited to a fine of $1000 or one
year in prison or both. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1982). Today the penalty is limited to a fine of
$2,50,000 or five years in prison or both. Id. § 5322(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1982).
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transactions are suspect; they are often a clue to underlying criminal

activity.3 As Congressman McKinney said, "What legitimate business
in the United States of America today transfers money in cash?" 5
Cash is the only practical medium in some businesses, and those are

recognized in statutory exceptions.36 Usually, though, large cash transactions are indeed suspect. Moreover, cash is riskier than other types
of paper due to the possibility of loss or theft. The willingness to
accept the higher risk makes large cash transactions even more suspect. Thus, Congress concluded that reports of large currency transactions would be valuable in ferreting out crime 7
The reporting statute and regulations take an indirect approach in
that they only require information. Large cash transactions are not
illegal, but they must be reported. Failure to report such transactions,
however, is criminal. Once the bank files the report, people are free
to deal in cash without constraints.
The bank reporting law attacks laundering by alerting the government to the process at its earliest point, the initial cash transactions.
As the laundering process continues, the transactions become byzantine and more difficult to trace. The initial cash transactions are a
vulnerable point because large amounts of cash are difficult to obscure.
From the government's perspective, the cash transactions are an attractive target because they occur early in the laundering process and
are conspicuous.

34.

H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEWS 4396 ("Criminals deal in money - cash or its equivalent. The deposit and
withdrawal of large amounts of currency or its equivalent (monetary instruments) under unusual
circumstances may betray a criminal activity.").
35. Briefing on the 1970 CurrencyandForeign TransactionsReportingAct: HearingBefore
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1985).
36. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(ii) (1988) provides exemptions from the reporting requirement
for, inter alia, sports arenas, race tracks, amusement parks, bars, restaurants, hotels, and
vending machine companies.
37. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39 (1974) ("Congress recognized the
importance of reports of large and unusual currency transactions in ferreting out criminal activity
and desired to strengthen the statutory basis for requiring such reports."); see also United
States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 789 n.1 (2d Cir.) (large cash transactions are often part of
money laundering process), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United States v. Giancola, 783
F.2d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting) ("[Clurrency is the life blood of organized
crime.', cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4396-97 ('These reports may be of considerable
value to law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations and prosecutions.").
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C.

Problems with the Statute and the JudicialResponse

The Act and regulations became effective in 1971.38 In the early

years banks largely ignored the reporting law. 39 United States
attorneys apparently ignored the law as well, because few criminal
cases were reported before the late 1970s. 40 At that time, appellate
case law began to develop, and the early cases upheld the prosecutions.41 Beginning in 1985, however, the cases revealed two distinct

problems with the law.
One problem was that the regulations imposed the duty to report
cash transactions over $10,000 only on banks.4 The question arose
whether bank customers also had a duty to report these cash transactions. 43 Some courts found that customers did have such a duty, and
could therefore be held criminally liable for failure to file a report.44

38. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 401(a), 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
39. Few reports were filed in the early years. In 1975, 3,418 reports were filed. In 1979,
121,000 reports were filed. By the next year, the number almost doubled; 241,850 reports were
filed in 1980. In 1986, an estimated 3.2 million reports were filed. See Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, supranote 5, at 33 (statement of Brian Bruh,
Director, IRS Office of Criminal Investigations). The number of reports filed is also documented
in THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 8, at 9. See generally United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d
1521 (5th Cir. 1984) (referring to testimony that banks universally ignored the currency reporting
requirements); Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 5, at 100 (testimony
of James D. Harmon, Jr.) (referring to 'the banks' . . . now documented abysmal record of
ignoring the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, a law on the books for some 14
years ....
').
40. See THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 8, at 9 ("For most of the first decade after
passage of the [Bank Secrecy] Act, the Federal Government did not vigorously enforce its
provisions.") (footnote omitted).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1220 (1986); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979).
42. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1988) (quoted supra note 30).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
847 (1984).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Lafaurie, 833 F.2d 1468 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Richeson, 825 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986);
Puerto, 730 F.2d at 633; United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
United States v. Hayes, 827 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1987) (person not associated with financial
institution could not be punished as aider and abetter for conspiring to avoid currency transaction
reporting requirements); cf. United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.) (defendant was
not a customer but rather an employee of the financial institution; conviction sustained), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United Stated v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984) (customer
liable under the bank reporting law for giving false information on report rather than for failure
to file a report), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1986); United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1979) (same).
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These courts reasoned that customers were accomplices of the banks.45
Other courts refused to hold customers liable for failure to file a
report 46 on the basis that the regulations did not explicitly impose
such a duty. Criminal liability therefore would be unconstitutional
because the laws were too vague to provide fair notice. 47 These courts
often reasoned that while the enabling legislation granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to require "any... participant" to file
reports, the Secretary's regulations required only that "financial institutions" do so.- s Thus, the courts concluded, although he had the
power, the Secretary specifically had chosen not to require reports
from individuals.
Another problem with the reporting law was that the regulations
imposed a duty to report only if the cash transaction exceeded
$10,000. 49 Assume that Joe, a smurf, is in charge of converting cash
drug profits into cashier's checks. To do his job well, he does some
research -and finds that he can avoid the reporting requirement by
manipulating cash transactions so none exceeds $10,000. The cases
began to reveal such schemes. 50 The number of variables involved in

Courts addressing the liability of customers as accomplices of banks did not distinguish among
the three statutes (the bank reporting law, § 1001, and conspiracy) used to prosecute. See, e.g.,
United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986) (customer not liable under § 1001 & §
371); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985) (customer not liable under § 5313
& § 1001); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.) (customer liable under § 5313, §
1001 & § 371), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847 (1984); cf. United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788
(2d Cir.) (account executive liable under § 5313 & § 371), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).
45. The courts relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627,
633 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847 (1984); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092,
1099-1101 (11th Cir. 1983).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Larson, 796 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766
F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678 (1st Cir. 1985).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir.
1985). The statute and regulation are quoted supra notes 29-30.
49. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1988) (quoted supra note 30).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989
(1986). The defendant was an account executive with Merrill Lynch. Id. at 789. On July 26,
1982, he received a briefcase from a client containing $70,000 in cash, and he deposited $7,000
in 10 related accounts. Id. On the next day he transferred all the money into one joint account.
Id.; see also United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984) (defendant attempted to
avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement by withdrawing money from one bank and re-depositing
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financial transactions allowed smurfs like Joe endless opportunities for
manipulation. The variables included the number of banks, 51 the
number of branch offices of a particular bank,5 2 the number of teller
stations at one branch office,ss the number of instruments purchased,-4
the number of accounts at a particular bank,-s the time period during
which the transactions were conducted,ss and the number of persons
doing the transactions. 57 Manipulating these variables to keep each
transaction under $10,000 required manpower. The armies of lower
level operatives who appeared in banks became known as smurfs. As
they scurried from bank to bank executing transactions just under the
$10,000 reporting limit, they seemed to be everywhere, much like the

little blue cartoon characters.ss

it in another bank, using a false identity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1986); United States v.
Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant and companion simultaneously deposited
$9,000 each in ten banks during a six-hour period).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1986).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1986).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir.) (checks),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir.
1979) (notes).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989
(1986).
56. Compare Heyman, 794 F.2d at 789 (transactions occurring simultaneously) and Bank
of New England, 821 F.2d at 847 (same) with United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679
(1st Cir. 1985) (transactions occurring over a two-week period) and United States v. Konefal,
566 F. Supp. 698, 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (transactions over a two-month period).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1983) (two
people go to each bank; each person buys a $9,000 cashier's check).
58. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand UrbanAffairs, supra
note 5, at 179 (smurfs scurry from bank to bank with increments of less than $10,000); id. at
665 (term "smurfs" originated because like the cartoon characters, there are many of them
running around everywhere); id. at 792 (the problem of smurfing); id. at 818 (smurfs would be
good both as defendants and as witnesses); Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 21 (the "well known practice of smurfing"); id.
at 41 (smurfs traveled to banks all over the United States); id. at 61 (structuring is "commonly
known as smurfing"); id. at 79 (structured cash conversion schemes often dubbed "smurfing");
id. at 87 (long lines at banks discourage smurfs who go to other metropolitan areas to smurf
cash); id. at 89 (law is ineffective, so launderers just "smurf away"); id. at 124 (referring to an
"anti-smurfing" regulatory measure); id. at 150 (smurfs as relatively low on the organized crime
totem pole); id. at 191 (smurfs convert illegally obtained cash into cashier's checks); id. at 226
(smurfs are escaping liability); see also Restriction on Purchase Money Orders, 52 Fed. Reg.
27,992 (1987) (temporary restriction on amount of money orders a customer can buy in one day
adopted to prevent smurfs from using money orders to launder drug money).
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These schemes exploited the lack of any aggregation requirement
in the statutes or regulations that defined a $10,000 transaction. The
instructions on the back of the reporting form provided for aggrega-

tion, 59 but whether these instructions could serve as the basis for
criminal prosecution was uncertain at best6° Some courts specifically

found the instructions to be nonbinding. 6'
The judicial response to the smurfs' use of multiple transactions
to avoid filing a report was mixed. In some limited circumstances,
courts were willing to collapse the transactions and aggregate the
amounts to reach $10,000, thus rendering the defendant liable for
failure to file. 62 Generally, though, courts refused to aggregate transactions63 and declared the defendants' conduct noncriminal.6 These
courts reasoned that no language in the statute or regulations imposed
a duty to aggregate transactions. A criminal conviction therefore would
be unconstitutional because nothing clearly warned the defendant that
the conduct was criminal.65 The courts that refused to find defendants
liable often stated that it was for Congress or the Executive to declare

59. See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679 n.6 (1st Cir. 1985). The form provided:
"Multiple transactions by or for any person which in any one day total more than $10,000 should
be treated as a single transaction, if the financial institution is aware of them." Id.
60. See, e.g., id. at 684 (Aldrich, J., concurring); United States v. Palzer, 745 F.2d 1350,
1357 (11th Cir. 1984) (no specific ruling but suggests that instructions are binding); Tobon-Builes,
706 F.2d at 1097-98 (court mentions instructions but extent of reliance thereon is unclear).
61. See United States v. Reinis, 794 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1986) (bank reporting form
not effective as regulation because not in compliance with Administrative Procedure Act); Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 679 n.6; United States v. Cogswell, 637 F. Supp. 295, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
62. See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.) (simultaneous
transfer, same teller window, multiple instruments), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United
States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir.) (simultaneous transfer, same representative,
multiple instruments), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d
1549, 1551-52 (11th Cir.) (same day, same bank but different branches, multiple instruments)
(distinguishing United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986) on the basis that
Denemark involved different banks), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v.
Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1979) (simultaneous transfer, same teller, multiple
instruments); cf. United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant and
girlftiend went to same branch office of same bank, each completed $9,000 transaction at different
tellers; court treated this as one transfer of $18,000).
63. See United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dela
Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766
F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Cogswell, 637 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1986).
65. See United States v. Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1988); Varbel, 780 F.2d
at 760-61; United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678 (1st Cir. 1985).

MONEY LAUNDERING

299

conduct criminal, not the courts.r Noting further that a Comptroller
General's report had identified this aggregation loophole, the courts
relied on the Secretary's subsequent inaction to conclude that the
Secretary
knew of the problem but apparently had chosen not to cure
6
it. 7

Disagreement on the issues of customer liability and aggregation
of transactions caused a split in the circuits.6 The two issues raised
distinct questions. Sometimes a case would present just one of these

issues,69 but frequently they were intertwined.70 When that happened,
courts generally failed to distinguish the issues.7' The law grew into

confused disarray.
D.

Governmental Response to Misadventure in the Courts

The government responded to these problems. The Secretary of
the Treasury amended the regulations,7 and Congress passed a new

criminal statute.7
1. Revised Regulations to Address Aggregation
The Secretary amended the regulations of the bank reporting law
to deal with the aggregation question74 First, a new regulation

66. See United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549, 1553-54 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v. Cogswell, 637 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
67. See Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 681-82; Cogswell, 637 F. Supp. at 297-98.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-67; see also United States v. Mastronardo, 849
F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting "severe split among the circuits" on issue of customer
liability); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1310 (2d Cir.) (noting split of authority
on issue of customer liability), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); N. ABRAMS, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND iTs ENFORCEMENT 119 (Supp. 1986).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1986) (aggregation
only); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.) (customer liability only), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 847 (1984).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1986).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.
1983); United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979).
72. Amendments to Implementing Regulations Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg.
11,442 (1987) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1988)).
In addition to these direct responses to loopholes in the reporting law, Congress recently
adopted two new statutes which authorize new reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325,
5326, discussed in note 104 infra.
73. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986).
74. The Secretary did not amend the regulations to deal with the customer liability issue.
Individuals were under no duty to report. The authorizing statute, would have authorized such
a duty, see 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1982) (quoted supra note 29), but no duty was imposed due to
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clarified the status of branch banks.75 The old regulations did not
specifically address this issue, but the definitions of "bank" and "finan-

cial institution" suggested that each branch was a separate entity. 76
Thus, transactions conducted at multiple branches of one institution
would not be aggregated. Despite the language in these definitions,
the courts concluded that transactions occurring at different branches
of one institution should be combined. 7The new regulation modified
the definition of financial institution 7s to reflect the courts' conclusion. 79
This modification codified the cases and left the law essentially unchanged.80
The Secretary also adopted a regulation that codified the aggregation instructions on the back of the reporting form.", As noted above,

the reporting form included aggregation instructions,1 but the force
of these instructions was unclear and the courts were reluctant to rely
on them as the basis of a criminal prosecution. This uncertainty has
been cured now that the instructions are embodied in a regulation.
The new regulation provides: "Multiple currency transactions shall be
treated as a single transaction if the financial institution has knowledge
that they are by or on behalf of any person and result in either cash

enforceability concerns. Telephone interview with John Landreth, Office of Financial Enforcement, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement), Department of the Treasury (Aug. 10,
1987).
75. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(4) (1988).
76. See id. § 103.11(a) (defining "bank" as "Each agent, agency, branch, or office within
the United States . . . .") (emphasis added); id. § 103.11(g) (defining 'fmancial institution" as
"[ejach agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States.. . .") (emphasis added).
77. See United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir.) ("[E]xchanges made by
a single person or his partners or associates in a single day, in different branches of the same
bank, do require the bank to file a [report]."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); accord United
States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
22
78. See 31 C.F.R. § 103. (a)(3) (1988) ("A financial institution includes all of its domestic
branch offices for the purpose of this paragraph's reporting requirements.").
79. The comments accompanying the new regulations state that the revision modifies the
definition of financial institution "to comport with recent case law." Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed.
Reg. 11,436 (3) (1987).
80. But cf. Giancola, 783 F.2d at 1554 n.1 (Hill, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that there
has been a recent amendment to 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) which in the future may or may not be
sufficient to pull transactions such as those in this case within the purview of the CTR reporting
requirement.").
81. See Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,442 (1987) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1)
(1988)).
82. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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in or cash out totalling more than $10,000 during any one business
day."&j
This regulation requires that three conditions exist before multiple
transactions are treated as one. The transactions must be "by or on
behalf of any person," the transactions must amount to over $10,000
cash in or cash out in a single day, and the bank must have knowledge
of both these conditions.s If any one of these conditions fails, then
multiple transactions are not treated as a single transaction. Assuming
that each individual transaction is for less than $10,000, the bank has
no duty to report.
This regulation raises several questions, some of which are resolved
in the comments accompanying the amendments. For example, the
comments indicate that only total cash in or cash out must be aggregated. 16 If $8000 and then $4000 are deposited in one account, the
transactions must be aggregated, but if $8000 is deposited and then
$4000 is withdrawn, aggregation is not required. Another question
the regulation does not explicitly address is whether deposits one
person makes to multiple accounts, or deposits multiple people make
to a single account, must be combined into a single transaction. The
comments indicate that in these situations, the presence of a single
person or single account means that transactions involving that person
or account must be combined and treated as a single transaction. 7
Other questions the regulation raises are not addressed in the
comments.8 One such question is the meaning of the requirement that
84. 31 C.F.R. §103.22(a)(1) (1988). This change necessitated a regulation to define "business
day." See id. § 103.11(q) (1988) ("Business day ... means that day, as normally communicated
to its depository customers, on which a bank routinely posts a particular transaction to its

customer's account.").
85. Id. § 103.22(a)(1). The comments accompanying the new regulation describe the phrase
"has knowledge." The comments state, 'Treasury has changed the term 'is aware' to 'has
knowledge.' This term means knowledge on the part of a partner, director, officer or employee
of a financial institution, or on the part of any edsting system at the institution that permits
it to aggregate transactions." See Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,437 (1987).
86. Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,438 (1987). The relevant comment provides,

Treasury also wishes to reiterate that 'cash in or cash out totalling more than
$10,000' means the total of all deposits or the total of all withdrawals. Deposits

and withdrawals are not to be aggregated together for purposes of the Bank
Secrecy Act. However, the total of all deposits or the total of all withdrawals
during a particular business day should be aggregated in order to determine if a

reportable deposit or withdrawal limit has been reached.
Id.
87. Id. "Examples of reportable transactions would be two people depositing more than
$10,000 in one account, though neither deposited a reportable amount, or one person making a

deposit of more than $10,000, but depositing the money in more than one account." Id.
88. One question the regulations raise is how to resolve a conflict between the new regulations on branch banks and aggregation. If transactions are accomplished at multiple banks,
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the transaction be "by or on behalf of any person."s The regulations
define "person" as broadly as possible9 This language is literally
meaningless because one cannot possibly conjure up a transaction that
is not "by or on behalf of any person." The drafters probably meant
to refer to transactions by or on behalf of a person or any single
person, but were wary of limiting the regulation in this way. To have
any meaning, the regulation should be interpreted to mean by or on
behalf of a person. 91
Another question is whether multiple transactions must be treated
as one if all three conditions are met,9 but the cash in or cash out is
transferred at different banks. The government's position is that a
bank is under no duty to aggregate transactions conducted at different
93
banks, even if the bank has knowledge of the other transactions.
The regulation as originally proposed would have captured this situation and required aggregation,9 but the Secretary rejected that reg95
ulation, at least temporarily, in favor of the one adopted.

the banks have no duty to aggregate the transactions and report, even if the bank has knowledge
of the multiple transactions. Yet if the transactions are done at multiple branches of the same
bank, the regulations treat them as occurring at one bank, and the bank must combine and
report them. But what if the bank does not know of the transactions at multiple branches?
Which regulation controls, the one requiring transactions to be combined among branches or the
one requiring aggregation only if the bank has knowledge? Treasury comments reveal that the
intent was for the knowledge requirement to control. Thus, if branch banks have no knowledge
of multiple transactions on behalf of one person, the bank need not combine and report the
transactions. See id. at 11,437 (quoted supra note 85).
89. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1988).
90. Id. § 103.11(1) ("Person. An individual, a corporation, a partnership, a trust or estate,
a joint stock company, an association, a syndicate, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization or group, and all entities cognizable as legal personalities.").
91. Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.60501 (1988). This regulation provides that for a similar reporting
law, 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. IV 1986), the aggregation requirement operates when the transaction is on behalf of "a person." See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
92. See supra text accompanying note 85.
93. Telephone interview with John Landreth, Office of Financial Enforcement, Office of the
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement), Department of the Treasury (Aug. 10, 1987).
94. 51 Fed. Reg. 30,233, at 30,234 as proposed (Aug. 25, 1986); see also Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 56 (prepared
statement of Richard C. Wassenaar, Assistant Commissioner (Criminal Investigation), Internal
Revenue Service).
95. The comments accompanying the new regulations mention that the regulations encompass all but three of the original proposals. Of the three not implemented, "two proposals,
dealing with the purchase of more than $3,000 in monetary instruments, are still under consideration by Treasury and will be the subject of a separate notice to be issued within the next
few months." Bank Secrecy Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,436 (1987).
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The amended regulations leave some options open to the ambitious
launderer. For example, Joe can manipulate time by limiting his cash
transactions to $10,000 or less each day. This is an unattractive option,
however, because the laundering process will be too slow for the
volume of cash that many drug organizations generate. Another option,
assuming Joe uses only a single bank, is to use multiple accounts and
multiple agents to limit the bank's knowledge of the relationship between multiple transactions. If the bank lacks such knowledge, it has
no duty to treat multiple transactions as single.9 Finally, Joe can use
multiple banks during a single day because the regulations do not
require aggregation of transactions conducted at different banks. 97 So
long as the transaction at each bank does not exceed $10,000, the
bank has no reporting obligation. 9
2.

Recognizing a New Crime

Because launderers still could avoid the aggregation regulations in
these ways, the regulations were an incomplete solution to the holes
in the reporting law. Thus Congress enacted a new statute, which
provides that no person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements (1) cause a financial institution to fail to file a required
report; (2) cause a financial institution to file a required report with
an omission or misstatement; or (3) structure any transaction with
one or more financial institutions. 99 Sanctions for violating this statute

96. The revised regulations include stricter provisions on customer identification that will
make it more difficult for smurfs to hide their identity from the banks. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.27
(1988).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
98. See id.; see also United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.) (bank required
to report aggregate transactions over $10,000 at different branches), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018
(1986); United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same).
99. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section
5313(a) with respect to such transaction - (1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic
financial institution to fail to file a report required under section 5313(a); (2) cause
or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report required under
section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or (3)
structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring,
any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
The Secretary adopted a regulation mimicking the statute. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.53 (1988).
The comments accompanying this regulation state that the "amendment merely incorporates
into the regulations the new statutory violation of structuring ..
" Bank Secrecy Act, 52
Fed. Reg. 11,440 (1987).
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include forfeiture, 1°° civil penalties, 101 and criminal sanctions of up to
$250,000 in fines, five years in prison, or both. 1°0 The statute is officially
titled "Structuring transactions to evade reporting requirement prohibited." 10 3 Unofficially, the statute should be called the "anti-smurfing
1
statute," in honor of the smurfs who prompted it.'4
III.
A.

THE ANTI-SMURFING STATUTE

Elements and Theory of the Offense
1. Clause (1)

Clause (1)105 takes conduct previously defined as criminal, failure

of a bank to file a report, and extends liability to any person who
causes that failure. This amounts to an accomplice liability provision
tailored to the specific crime of failing to file a report. Federal law
includes a general accomplice liability statute, 1 6 but the courts have

100. There is some confusion over forfeiture. See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5321(a)(4)(C), 5321(c)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), both of which refer to structured transaction forfeiture provision §
5317(d). But no § 5317(d) appears. Id.
101. See id. § 5321(a)(4); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47(e) (1988).
102. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
103. Id. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986).
104. In addition to the amended regulations and the anti-smurfing statute which took effect
in 1987, the government response to smurfing was bolstered again in November, 1988 when
Congress added two new statutes with expanded reporting requirements. See Money Laundering
Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690, Nov. 18, 1988, codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5325, 5326. One statute, § 5325, basically requires banks to check and verify identification
for persons purchasing with cash any instrument over $3,000. This statute authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt regulations defining the type of identification required and the
records that banks must keep on the identification. (The Secretary has begun the process of
prescribing regulations, see Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. No. 247,
p.518 4 6-47 (Dec. 23, 1988)). All records must be provided to the Secretary upon request. 31
U.S.C. § 5325. The other statute basically authorizes the Secretary to target a particular bank
or geographic group of banks and order them to keep such records and provide such information
on currency transactions as the Secretary may require. 31 U.S.C. § 5326.
These new reporting requirements will make smurfing more difficult. For example, cash
purchases of cashier's checks will have to be below the $3,000 threshold or the identification
provisions will increase the likelihood of bank knowledge that separate transactions are all by
or on behalf of one person. See text accompanying note 96 supra. Or the Secretary might target
a particular bank to report all cash transactions over $1,000. Aside from making smurfing more
difficult, these new reporting requirements have no impact on the operation of the anti-smurfing
statute because the statute is based exclusively on the reporting requirements of § 5313.
105. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986). "No person shall for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements of section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction - (1)
cause or attempt
to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report required under section 5313(a) .. .
Id.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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disagreed on its applicability to nonreporting.17° Congress responded
to this disagreement by adopting this particularized accomplice liability
provision. 0s
This provision of clause (1) is obsolete today. Assume Joe goes to
Bank A at ten o'clock, one o'clock, and three o'clock. Each time he
buys a $4000 cashier's check with cash. To find Joe in violation of
clause (1), Bank A must have a duty to file a report, and must fail
to do so. Under the regulations, Bank A has a duty to fie only if it
knows that multiple transactions for one person total cash in or cash
out over $10,000 in one day. If Bank A meets these criteria, i.e., it
knows of Joe's three transactions, how could Joe "cause" its failure
to fie?
The explanation for this anomaly is historical. Congress drafted
and adopted clause (1) of the anti-smurfing statute before the Secretary of the Treasury revised the regulations to impose the aggregation
requirement. Because clause (1) was designed to impose liability on
customers, the bank's knowledge was irrelevant. Under the revised
regulation, however, if the bank is ignorant of one person's multiple
transactions on one day, it has no duty to combine the transactions
and therefore no duty to file a report. Joe's three trips, of course,
caused the bank's ignorance and its consequent lack of duty to fie.
Even so, Joe cannot be held liable for causing failure to perform an act
that the bank had no duty to perform.
Clause (1) also contains an attempt provision. Federal law includes
no general attempt statute, but instead incorporates attempt language
in individual statutes.10 9 When Congress defines a new crime, it
routinely includes attempt language. The attempt language of clause
(1) still is vital under the regulations because it encompasses situations
in which a customer attempts to mislead a bank, but the bank discovers
the attempt and files a report. For example, assume Joe goes to Bank
B at two o'clock and pays $9000 cash for a cashier's check, then returns
at four o'clock and does the same. To avoid a report, Joe uses false
identification on the four o'clock trip. Bank B discovers that Joe ac-

107.

Compare United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983) (§ 2 is

applicable) with United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985) (§ 2 is not applicable).
See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.

108. At the same time, Congress declined to enact a general criminal facilitation statute.
See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and UrbanAffairs, supra note

5, at 834 (prepared statement of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott); Joost, Simplifying Federal CriminalLaws, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1986).
109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1951, 1952(a) (1982); id. § 1344 (Supp. III 1985).
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complished both transactions and files a report. Under clause (1), the
government can charge Joe with attempting to cause Bank B to fail
to fie.
2. Clause (2)
Clause (2)110 makes it a crime to cause a bank to fie a report
containing a material omission or misstatement. In this situation, the
bank is aware of the cash transaction over $10,000. The bank reporting
law already defines making any misstatement in a report as a crime. 1 '
Clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute extends liability to those who
cause misstatements. Clause (2) also imposes criminal liability for causing a material omission in a report, conduct the bank reporting law
does not reach.
Another criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, affects the same conduct."2 Causing the filing of a bank report with an omission may be
criminal under section 1001,11 and causing the filing of a false report
is always criminal under section 1001.114 Therefore, clause (2) of the
anti-smurfing statute defines new criminal conduct in some omission
fact patterns. In most cases, however, its impact is to impose another

110. 37 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986). "No person shall for the purpose of evading the
. . (2) cause or
reporting requirements of section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction -.
attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report required under section 5313(a)
that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact . . . ." Id.
111. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(d) (1988) ("Any person who knowingly makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or representation in any report required by this part may, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.").
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 236-64).
113. Section 1001 prohibits concealment of material facts, but only by "trick, scheme or
device." Id.; United States v. Woodward, 406 U.S. 105 (1985). Thus, if a report contains an
omission, but the omission is not attributable to a trick, scheme, or device, the concealment
would not fall under § 1001. In this circumstance, clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute makes
otherwise legal conduct criminal.
114. See United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 633 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847

(1984).
The elements of § 1001 in the false statement context have been summarized: 'Proof of five
elements is essential ... under the false statement proscription of § 1001: (1) a statement, (2)
falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5) agency jurisdiction." United States v. Lange,
528 F.2d 1280, 1287 (5th Cir. 1976). A false statement on a currency transaction report would
satisfy all five elements. Congress intended this result and wrote a statute to insure it. See
31 U.S.C. § 1052(k) (1976) (repealed 1982) ("For the purposes of section 1001 ... the contents
of reports required under any provision of this title are statements and representations in
matters within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States."). This statute was later
eliminated as unnecessary. See Woodward, 406 U.S. at 107 n.6.
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layer of liability to conduct already deemed criminal under other
laws. 115
In addition, like clause (1), clause (2) prohibits attempts to cause
incomplete or false filings. This attempt language defines new criminal
conduct.
3.

Clause (3)

Clause (3)116 defines an entirely new crime. Clause (3) makes it
illegal to structure any transaction with one or more banks for the
purpose of evading the reporting requirement. This clause addresses
both problems the original bank reporting statute raised: customer
liability and manipulation of transactions. Clause (3) establishes customer liability by imposing liability on anyone who assists or attempts
to assist in structuring a transaction. Yet the crux of clause (3) relates
to manipulation; it closes the loopholes remaining under the revised
regulations.
As noted above, launderers have three methods available under
the revised regulations to avoid aggregation and the duty to report. 117
Clause (3) covers each of these. First, the crime of structuring is not
limited to transactions accomplished in a particular time period. Thus,
transactions that would avoid aggregation under the regulations because $10,000 or less was transferred during one day would still qualify
as structured transactions under clause (3). Second, because the crime
of structuring does not depend on the banks knowledge, using multiple
agents and multiple accounts to keep the bank in the dark on the total
transactions would not defeat liability under clause (3). Third, the
crime of structuring includes transactions accomplished at "one or
more domestic financial institutions, ' so conducting the transactions
at multiple banks will not avoid liability. This clause is independent
of the aggregation regulation, thus it prohibits all structuring regardless of whether the bank has a duty to file a report.
The mens rea required for the crime of structuring is two-tiered.
Conviction of any crime under the reporting laws requires willful-

115.
116.

See infra text accompanying notes 236-64.
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986). "No person shall for the purpose of evading the

reporting requirements of section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction -.
. . (3) structure
or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with
one or more domestic financial institutions." Id. Aside from the basic crime of structuring, this
clause also includes complicity and inchoate provisions.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
118. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
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ness. 119 In addition, the anti-smurfing statute requires that the defen-

dant act for the purpose of evading the bank reporting law.12o The
combination of these two mens reas, each of which is rigorous alone,
121
makes the mens rea element even more difficult to prove.
The conduct element is defined less precisely. It is illegal to "structure" a "transaction." The regulations define the term 'transaction in
currency" as a physical transfer of currency. m The definition of "structure" is more complicated. The statute contains no explicit definition,
and the popular definition is not helpful,123 so legislative intent is
relevant. m The legislative history reveals no explicit congressional
statement of intent concerning the meaning of the term "structure."
But the legislative history does include an example of structuring,2

119. See id. § 5322 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
120. The statute begins, "No person shall for the purpose of evading the reportingrequirements of section 5313(a)... ." Id. § 5324 (emphasis added); see also Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 846 (prepared statement of
Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott) ("structuring" is present when transactions are
broken up "in order not to trigger the report filing requirements").
121. The mens rea will be even more difficult to establish if the courts impose a requirement
of knowledge of the law. See infra text accompanying notes 135-81.
122. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(o) (1988) ("Transactionin currency. A transaction involving
the physical transfer of currency from one person to another.").
123. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (reliance on common meaning of
statutory term). WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1146 (1981) defines the verb "to
structure" as to form into "something arranged in a definite pattern of organization." Another
definition which might apply is provided for the noun "structure": 'The aggregate of elements
of an entity in their relationships to each other." Id. Neither definition is enlightening in this
criminal context.
124. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978) (reliance on legislative intent in
construing federal criminal statute); Justice Dep't Handbook on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 (Mar. 1987) ("[Subsection (3)] is the only one ... that presents any significant problems
of interpretation because the statute does not define 'structuring.' This definitional problem is
hardly insurmountable if care is taken in bringing cases that Congress clearly intended to be
covered by this section.").
125. See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1986). The legislative history provides,
in pertinent part:
[A] person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashier's checks by purchasing two
$9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or on two different days with the
specific intent that the participating bank or banks not be required to file [reports]
for those transactions, would be subject to potential civil and criminal liability. A
person conducting the same transactions for any other reasons or a person splitting
up an amount of currency that would not be reportable if the full amount were
involved in a single transaction (for example, splitting $2,000 in currency into four
transactions of $500 each), would not be subject to liability under [clause] (3).
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and the testimony of the government drafters reveals what they intended by the term. 6 In the drafters' view, "structuring" is "breaking
up a single currency transaction of more than $10,000 into separate

smaller transactions in order not to trigger the [report] filing requirements." This definition is bolstered by the courts' use of the term
in this way in cases decided prior to the anti-smurfing statute. m These
definitions render the conduct element precisely congruous with the
mens rea requirement.
Defining a criminal offense based on the structure of one's finances

suggests an analogy to tax law. If Joe can legitimately structure his
finances to avoid paying taxes, is it not correspondingly legitimate to
structure finances to avoid reporting cash transactions? The answer
is no. The courts recognized that this analogy was faulty but failed
to identify the reason.m The analogy falls because the two acts, structuring finances to avoid paying taxes and structuring finances to avoid
filing reports, have different purposes. When he structures to avoid
taxes, Joe saves money but still provides information to the government. In contrast, when Joe structures to avoid the bank reporting
law, he denies the government information. The statutory use of the
term "evade" rather than "avoid" 13° expresses the congressional conclu-

126. See HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, supra
note 5, at 66 ("structured" currency transactions are "currency transactions which are intentionally broken down into a series of smaller transactions, each under $10,000, for the purpose of
evading the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act") (prepared statement of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General James Knapp); Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, sulyra note 5, at 846 (prepared statement of Assistant Attorney
General Stephen S. Trott) ("'Structuring' as used by the government in criminal prosecutions
under Title 31 of the United States Code, consists of breaking up a single currency transaction
of more than $10,000 into separate smaller transactions in order not to trigger the [report] filing
requirements.').
127. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra
note 5, at 846 (prepared statement of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott).
128. The verb "structuring" was first used in United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200,
1202 (5th Cir. 1979). Other courts also adopted the term. See United States v. Giancola, 783
F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766
F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Bank of New England, 640 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D. Mass.
1986), affd, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United States v.
Cogswell, 637 F. Supp. 295, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
The Senate Report acknowledges the common law definition by stating that the anti-smurfing
statute is intended to "codify Tobon-Builes and like cases." S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 22 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Thompson, 603 F.2d at 1203-04.
130. The anti-smurfing statute begins, "No person shall for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements of section 5313(a) ...." 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis
added).
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sion that any reason to resist reporting is illegitimate and therefore
an evasion. While one might legitimately avoid taxes, 131 there exists
no concept of legitimate avoidance of the reporting requirement.' 12
The anti-smurfing statute is based implicitly on the judgment that
resistance to reporting cash transactions is even more suspect than
the large cash transactions themselves. This judgment is reasonable
because no legitimate reason exists to resist reporting large cash transactions. The time it takes Joe to provide the bank with the information
for the report is negligible, and it will not cost him any money when
the bank files a report.
Joe might object to the bank filing a report on the basis that the
report invades his privacy, and that it is a scary situation indeed when
the government is entitled to collect information (unrelated to taxes)
on financial arrangements. Perhaps Joe is averse to the government
knowing about his transactions. When balanced against the threat to
society that the drug trade and money laundering pose, however, the
threat to Joe's privacy is not compelling. The reduction in privacy is
minimal. This country has a tradition of protecting individual privacy
from governmental interference, but in view of the documented dangers of drugs and laundering, laws that protect individual privacy at
all costs have become a luxury. The anti-smurfing statute results in
less than perfect individual privacy, but the harms of drugs and laundering warrant the minimal reduction. Congress in effect made this
judgment when it defined structuring to evade the reporting law as
a crime.
Beyond inconvenience and privacy, Joe may have another reason
for resisting the reporting requirement. Joe may need to hide other
criminal activity. This reason is patently illegitimate and is one the
law should neither recognize nor endorse.'34
B.

Knowledge of Illegality

The anti-smurfing statute applies only when the defendant acts for
the purpose of evading the bank reporting requirement. 1 5 Assume Joe

131. On the concept of legitimate tax avoidance, see Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d
848, 850-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810
(2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See generally Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating
Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1953).
132.

But cf. J. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES § 6.05[4][a] (1988).

133. A copy of Form 4789 (Currency Transaction Report) is reproduced in the Appendix.
134. For a discussion of the implications of the privilege against self-incrimination, see infra
text accompanying notes 190-99.
135. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986) (quoted supra note 99).
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goes to the bank five days in a row and each day pays $9000 in cash
for a cashier's check. If Joe is unaware of the bank reporting law, he
is not smurfing because he does not have the required motive to evade
the bank reporting law. Joe is smurfing, however, if he is aware of
the bank reporting law and structures his transactions to avoid a
report. A smurfing conviction is impossible unless the defendant knows
of the bank reporting law.
A separate question is whether a smurfing conviction is possible
without knowledge of the anti-smurfing law as well. What happens if
Joe knows of the bank reporting law and structures his transactions
to avoid reporting, but is unaware that such structuring is itself a
crime? In other words, is knowledge of illegality an element of smurfing, thus making ignorance of the anti-smurfing law a defense?" 3c Some
defendants have recently asserted that ignorance of the law is in fact

a defense.137
The express terms of the anti-smurfing statute do not require
knowledge of the law, 138 so the question of whether knowledge of
illegality is an element will be left to the courts.'39 In United States
4
v. Balint 4o and United States v. Freed,1
' the statutes prohibited selling

136. Asking whether knowledge of illegality is an element of the crime is an alternative
way of asking whether ignorance of the law is a defense. If knowledge of illegality is an element,
then ignorance of the law is necessarily a defense; if knowledge is not an element, ignorance is
not a defense. Either formulation raises the same issue, and this article uses the two formulations
interchangeably.
137. See Proposed Amendment to Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Providing for Notice to
Customers of Anti-Structuring Provision by Financial Institutions, 53 Fed. Reg. 7948 (1988) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Mar. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Proposed Amendment
to Bank Secrecy Act Regulations].
138. The conclusion that the express terms of the statute do not require knowledge of
illegality assumes that the anti-smurfing statute's requirement of a purpose to evade the reporting
requirement of § 5313 does not include knowledge of illegality.
139. If a statute is silent or ambiguous, a court tries to discern congressional intent from
other sources, like the legislative history. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922)
(mens rea of empty statute is "a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court");
see, e.g., United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (looking to legislative history); United
States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (same). The legislative
history of the anti-smurfing statute does not indicate whether Congress intended knowledge of
the law to be an element. If the legislative history is unhelpful because it is silent, see, e.g.,
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Balint, 258 U.S. at 250, or ambiguous, see, e.g.,
InternationalMinerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 558, a court falls back on common law
principles to interpret the statute. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423-28.
140. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
141. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
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narcotics'4 and possessing unregistered hand grenades,143 respectively.
Because the materials regulated were physically dangerous,'" the Supreme Court declined to infer knowledge of illegality as an element
and thus concluded that ignorance of the law was no defense.4 5
Likewise, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.,146 the Court concluded that knowledge of the statute prohibiting

shipping acid without proper documentation was not an element of
the crime.147 The International Minerals Court reasoned that the
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse was so ensconced in our
criminal law that it trumps ambiguous congressional statements.'"
Moreover, because acid is inherently dangerous, the probability of
regulation was so great that knowledge of the law could be presumed.14

142. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
143. Freed, 401 U.S. at 602-04.
144. In both cases, the Court primarily based its refusal to require knowledge of illegality
on the dangerous character of the regulated items. In Balint, the Court stated, "Congress
weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of
exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the
result preferably to be avoided." Balint, 258 U.S. at 254. In Freed, the Court stated, "[Hand
grenades] are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than the narcotics involved
in [Balint] .

. . ."

Freed, 401 U.S. at 609. However, the Court also mentioned other factors

indicating that knowledge of illegality should not be an element. In Balint, the Court referred
to the likelihood of the defendant's knowledge and the difficulty of proof. See Balint, 258 U.S.
at 254. In Freed, the Court referred to the likelihood of the defendant's knowledge. See Freed,
401 U.S. at 609 (the statute "may well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be
surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act") (footnote omitted).
145. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. The language of Balint is ambiguous as to whether the issue
was ignorance of law or fact. The indictment charged the defendants with unlawfully selling
opium and coca leaves not on the written order form required by statute. Id. The Court stated,
' The defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge that they
had sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such." Id. Did the defendants not know that
the substances were drugs, or did they not know that the substances were inhibited? At another
point, the Court stated that the purpose of the statute was to penalize those who sold the
inhibited drug "in ignorance of its character." Id. at 254. Does this mean in ignorance of its
character as opium, or in ignorance of its character as illegal? Balint does not adequately resolve
this confusion, but in a later case, the Court clarified the matter by characterizing the issue in
Balint as a question of ignorance of law. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 609.
146. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
147. Id. at 563-64. The statute provided that whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation" would be fined or imprisoned. Id. at 559 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (1970)).
148. Id. at 563 ('We conclude that the meager legislative history of the 1960 amendments
makes unwarranted the conclusion that Congress abandoned the general rule and required
knowledge of both the facts and the pertinent law before a criminal conviction could be sustained
... ."). But cf. id. at 565-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (describing the "explicit legislative history").
149. Id. at 565.
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The Court's mention of the second basis undermines the first, and
indicates the Court's ambivalence toward the maxim that ignorance
of the law is no excuse.
That ambivalence culminated in United States v. Liparota,15 0 in
which the Court held that ignorance of the law was a defense to the
crime of unauthorized acquisition of food stamps. 15' The anti-smurfing
statute is more analogous to the statute construed in Liparota than
those in Balint and Freed because the items the statutes regulate in
the former, structured cash transactions and unauthorized food
stamps, pose no physical danger. Many of the bases for the Liparota
decision also apply to the anti-smurfing statute. The Liparota Court

did not rely on congressional intent in construing the food stamp
statute because it characterized the statutory language as ambiguous
and the legislative history as silent. 152 Likewise, the language and
legislative history of the anti-smurfing statute both are silent on knowledge of illegality. The LiparotaCourt applied the rule of lenity"' and
concluded that because the ambit of the statute was unclear, the
defendant should get the benefit.5 Because the coverage of the antismurfing statute is unclear in the same way as the statute at issue
in Liparota, the rule of lenity would have the same impact on the
anti-smurfing statute. Thus Liparotawould likely control the courts'
interpretation of the anti-smurfing statute.

150. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
151. Id. at 433-34.
152. Id. at 424-26, 430 n.13.
The Liparota Court also stated that a background assumption of our criminal law is that
criminal offenses require a mens rea and Congress's silence or ambiguous statements in the
food stamp statute are insufficient to signal a departure from this tenet. Id. at 426. This rationale
is disingenuous. Surely our criminal law assumes that a mens rea is required, but that mens
rea has traditionally extended only to knowledge of facts, not law. Compare Model Penal Code
§ 2.04(1)(a) & commentary at 269-71 (1985) (ignorance of fact or law is a defense if it negates
the rnens rea required for the crime) with id. § 2.02(9) & commentary at 248 (mens rea as to
illegality of conduct is generally not required). See also Note, Ignorance of the Law as an
Excuse, 86 COLUA. L. REV. 1392, 1399-1400 (1986) (discussing whether Liparota creates a
defense of mistake of criminal law). The Liparota Court cited United States v. Morisette, 342
U.S. 246 (1952), for the principle that a mens rea is required. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425-26. But
the mers rea required in Morisette extended to knowledge of facts (whether the bomb casings
were owned or abandoned), not to knowledge of law (whether stealing was a crime). See
Morisette, 342 U.S. at 276. Thus Morisette is no precedent for Liparota. Finally, it is ironic
that Liparotacharacterized the mens rea of knowledge of illegality as a "background assumption
of our criminal law," Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426, when just 14 years earlier the Court emphasized
"the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse." United States v. International Minerals
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
153. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.
154. Id. (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
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Yet one of the rationales of Liparota has questionable impact on
the anti-smurfing statute. The Liparota Court held that requiring
knowledge of illegality was appropriate in order to avoid criminalizing
a broad range of innocent conduct.,' Applying this reasoning to the
anti-smurfing statute, can structuring cash transactions to avoid a
reporting law be characterized as innocent conduct?
Structuring cash transactions to avoid reporting might be construed
as innocent. One reason is that people may feel that their experience
with tax law informs them that structuring cash transactions is acceptable conduct. Although the tax law analogy is defective for reasons
discussed above,'1 courts should not expect this level of analysis from
the typical bank customer. Another reason that structuring cash transactions might be innocent conduct is that this country historically has
protected individual privacy from governmental intrusion. Arranging
cash transactions to avoid a report to the government would strike
many people as acceptable conduct, or at least noncriminal. At any
rate, structuring cash transactions seems as likely to be deemed "innocent" as the conduct in Liparota, in which the defendant furtively
bought food stamps that were stamped "nontransferable" at a substantial discount. 57
On the other hand, structuring cash transactions to avoid reporting
to the government arguably is not innocent. To treat smurfing as
innocent requires a narrow definition of innocence, one related only
to the defendant's ignorance of this particular statute. Smurfs know
of the bank reporting law and purposely evade it. As noted above,
the only reason to avoid the reporting law is to hide other crime.
Smurfing cannot be isolated from the laundering process, nor can it
be isolated from the underlying crime that generates the cash. To
define smurfing as innocent conduct demands both that we ignore the
impetus for smurfing and adopt a compartmentalized definition of innocence. The law need not be limited to a fictional, counterintuitive
definition of innocence. Smurfs are not necessarily innocent, even if
they are unaware of the anti-smurfing statute.
The implications of Liparota for the anti-smurfing statute are
mixed.'5 Other factors are relevant in analyzing whether ignorance

155. Id. at 425-26.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31 (tax analogy).
157. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434 n.17; see Note, supra note 152, at 1415 n.122.
158. One other case is helpful in understanding the Court's approach to ignorance of the
law as a defense. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), a municipal ordinance required
all convicted felons living in Los Angeles to register with the city. Id. at 226. The ordinance
was silent on knowledge of illegality and the Court mentioned no legislative history. Id. at
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227-30. The Court held that ignorance of the law was a defense and that due process requires
notice that conduct is criminal. Id. at 227. Because this ordinance criminalized mere unregistered
presence in a city, due process precluded conviction unless the prosecution showed knowledge
of illegality or the probability of knowledge. Id. at 229-30.
Lambert differs from Balint, Freed, InternationalMinerals & Chem. Corp., and Liparota
in two ways. First, the Court based its decision on the due process clause of the Constitution
rather than on canons of statutory construction. Id. Of course, because the case involved a Los
Angeles ordinance rather than a federal statute, the Court had to base its decision on the
Constitution in order to take jurisdiction. Id. at 266. Even so, the decision reveals the Court's
willingness to find that knowledge of illegality is constitutionally mandated; the decision is
important for that reason.
Lambert also differs from the four cases discussed above because the ordinance in Lambert
criminalized pure omission to act while the other statutes depended on some element of positive
conduct. In Balint, the conduct was selling opium and coca leaves without an IRS form. United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922). In Freed, the conduct was receiving unregistered
hand grenades. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 603 (1971). In InternationalMinerals &
Chem. Corp., the conduct was shipping acid without reflecting it on shipping papers. United
States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 558 (1971). In Liparota, the
conduct was purchasing food stamps at less than face value. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 421-22.
Yet Balint, Freed and IMC arguably can be characterized as omission cases as well. In
Balint, defendants omitted to use the prescribed IRS form; in Freed, defendant omitted to
receive registration papers with the grenades; and in IMC, defendant omitted to list the acid
on the shipping papers. These three cases can thus be characterized as omission cases due to
the lack of forms in each case. Even under this view, they still
differ from the Lambert ordinance.
The Lambert ordinance proscribed unregistered existence in Los Angeles and therefore included
no element of positive conduct at all. As the Supreme Court stated, "Registration laws are
common and their range is wide .... But the"[Lambert] ordinance is entirely different. Violation
of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being
the test . . . ." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
One other line of cases holding ignorance of law to be a defense deserves mention. Under
31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), persons importing or exporting $10,000 in monetary
instruments must file a report with the government. All courts confronting the issue have
concluded that knowledge .of the import/export reporting law is required before the defendant
can be convicted of violating it. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 889 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dichne,
612 F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Chen, 605 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1210-12 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granada,
565 F.2d 922, 925-27 (5th Cir. 1978). Some courts reached this conclusion based on the statutory
language. See, e.g., Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1211. But the statutory language is unclear;
even more so than statutory language the Supreme Court has found ambiguous in the past. See
supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (statute which requires "knowing violation" is ambiguous). Thus the courts relying on the language fail to explain their decisions adequately. The
better opinions recognize that knowledge of illegality should be inferred as an element because
the statute criminalizes omission to report otherwise innocent conduct. See, e.g., Warren, 612
F.2d at 891; Dichne, 612 F.2d at 636.
These cases construing the import/export reporting law have some predictive value for the
courts' response to the anti-smurfing statute. The cases holding that knowledge of illegality is
an element based on the statutory language are disingenuous and should be discounted. But if
courts applied the language rationale to the anti-smurfing statute, they would probably conclude
that its language requires knowledge of illegality. That conviction requires both a willful violation
and that the defendant act for the purpose of evading the reporting law would support this
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of the law should be a defense to the anti-smurfing statute. Inferring
knowledge of illegality can be helpful to limit arbitrary enforcement. 19
If a statute is written broadly so that many violate it, the police freely
may pursue the most blameworthy violators. Yet wide application
allows police so much discretion that they may decide whom to arrest
based on factors besides the violation of a statute. 160 If a statute encourages arbitrary enforcement, then ignorance should be a defense. It
would ensure that the law apply only to blameworthy people, and
would limit police discretion by narrowing the wide net that such a
law creates."6 '
The anti-smurfing statute, however, does not encourage arbitrary
enforcement. The statutory language defining the conduct of smurfing
(to structure a transaction) is broad, but the mens rea requires a
purposeful evasion of the bank reporting law.162 This mens rea limits
the number of persons who violate the anti-smurfing statute and limits
police discretion as well.
Another relevant question in determining whether ignorance should
be a defense is the likelihood that the defendant had notice that the
conduct was illegal. 163 If nothing in the situation a statute addresses
would alert a person to possible illegality, then ignorance should be
a defense.'-" Several factors illuminate the likelihood of notice. If the
proscribed conduct is malum in se because it involves possible physical

conclusion. In this way, these import/export cases indicate that knowledge of illegality will be
an element of the anti-smurfing statute.
The rationale mentioned in some import/export cases, namely that knowledge of illegality is
required because the statute criminalizes omission to report otherwise innocent conduct, does
not apply to the anti-smurfing statute. Smurfing is not based on an omission to report something,
but rather on the positive conduct of structuring a cash transaction. Thus, the omission concept
is irrelevant. Moreover, as discussed supra, smurfing is not really such innocent conduct that
defendants would have no notice that the conduct is criminal. Smurfing is not analogous to the
import/export reporting law, and the cases finding knowledge of illegality required for the latter
would have little value for predicting whether courts will require such knowledge for smurfing.
159. See Note, supra note 152, at 1402-03.
160. Id. at 1398.
161. Id. at 1408; see also id. at 1398 (drawbacks of unbridled police discretion).
162. Of course, this conclusion depends somewhat on what is required to show purpose to
evade the reporting law.
163. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (quoted supra note 144); see
also Note, supra note 152, at 1413 (courts should consider, among other factors, the likelihood
that defendant had notice of the law).
164. Note, supra note 152, at 1413-14. See generally Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) (ignorance of ordinance requiring all convicted felons to register with the city was a valid
defense because due process requires notice that the conduct is criminal); supra note 158 (discussion of Lambert v. California).
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n s' or has moral overtones, I' then the likelihood of notice is high. 167
harm
Smurfng involves no physical harm. As for moral overtones, smurfing
is not as obviously immoral as fraud or statutory rape, but an effort
to avoid the bank reporting law is not morally pure either. Smurfng
arises only in the wake of an effort to evade another law. Although
smurfing is morally ambiguous, Joe's intuition about criminal law
should cause him at least to question its legality.
Other circumstances are relevant to the likelihood of the defendant's notice. One factor is how pervasively the field is regulated.'r s
Defendants generally have knowledge of the law if they deal with a

highly regulated substance like alcohol. 169 Regulation of cash transac-

tions is not as pervasive. No state laws regulate cash transactions,
and the only relevant federal laws are the ones this article describes. 7 Nonetheless, a smurf by definition knows of the bank reporting law,
although he may be ignorant of the anti-smurfing law. Because smurfs
are aware of at least one law regulating cash transactions, the relatively limited extent of regulation does not indicate that smurfs' knowledge of the anti-smurfing law is less likely.
The specialized nature of smurfing also bears on the likelihood of
the defendant's knowledge. 17' A person dealing in an unusual substance
like dangerous chemicals or toxic waste is more likely familiar with
the law than a person dealing in pencils, dental floss, or paperclips.172
Cash transactions are not specialized activities, although extremely
large transactions subdivided into smaller increments are more unusual. Even so, the basic commodity of the anti-smurfing law is cash
transactions, which are difficult to put in the specialized category with
acid and toxic waste.17 '
Some factors affecting the likelihood of notice are unique to the
anti-smurfing statute. Assume Joe sets out to convert $500,000 in cash

165. One example might be possession of hand grenades. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 603.
166. An example might be distribution of misbranded and adulterated drugs. See United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
167. Note, supra note 152, at 1414.
168. See id.
169. Cf. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (defendants
in effect consent to government inspection by engaging in pervasively regulated industry).
170. Those laws include three reporting statutes (the bank reporting law, 31 U.S.C. §§
5311-14 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and the two described infra text accompanying notes 213-14);
the anti-smurfing statute, id. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986); and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. IV 1986)
(described infra text accompanying notes 221-22).
171. Note, supra note 152, at 1414.
172. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1970).
173. See id.
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into cashier's checks. Joe learns that the law requires banks to report
cash transactions over $10,000 to the government, and he learns that
reports can be avoided by simply keeping each transaction under
$10,000. As a practical matter, Joe should question whether such easy
evasion is too good to be true. The obviousness of the loophole should
cause Joe to question its legitimacy, and alert him that he is acting
in an area of questionable legality. Moreover, the Treasury Department is considering specific measures to provide notice of the law to
bank customers. 174 If any of these proposals is implemented, the likelihood that Joe will have knowledge of the law will be high.
The final issue in analyzing whether ignorance of the law should
be a defense is whether ignorance of the law is itself blameworthy. 175
If a reasonable person would be on notice of the possibility of criminal
liability, then that person should investigate; continuing ignorance of
the law is blameworthy in that situation.176 With regard to the antismuring statute, the blameworthiness of ignorance is fairly clear.
Smurfing is morally ambiguous enough that a defendant might not be
certain the conduct is criminal. Yet the factors discussed above relating
to the likelihood of knowledge indicate that smurfs should be alerted
at least to the potential of liability. Once on notice of potential liability,
smurfs reasonably may be expected to investigate the law. Smurfs
know they are evading the reporting law. They obviously have researched the scope of the law, and know how to avoid it. Because
smurfs are sophisticated enough to investigate the bank reporting law,
it is reasonable to impose on them a duty to investigate related laws.
If smurfs remain ignorant of the anti-smurfing statute, their ignorance
is blameworthy and should not be a defense.
In summary, various factors indicate that ignorance of the law
should not be a defense to the anti-smurfing statute. Admittedly,
dealing in cash transactions is not a specialized activity. Structuring
finances to avoid reporting to the government may seem acceptable
in view of the tax avoidance analogy and the American tradition of
privacy. Nevertheless, an ignorance defense is unnecessary to limit
arbitrary enforcement. The likelihood is high that smurfs have notice
that their conduct is questionable. Smurfs know of the bank reporting
law, so they are aware that laws exist regulating cash transactions.

174. See Proposed Amendment to Bank Secrecy Act Regulations, supra note 137.
175. See Note, supra note 152, at 1413. This issue is related to the second, namely whether
the defendant would have had notice of illegality. See id. at 1413-14.
176. Id. This criterion echoes the "willful blindness" doctrine courts developed to deal with
knowledge as a mens rea. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
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Their effort to evade the bank reporting law also has moral overtones;

it only can be deemed innocent by adopting an extremely narrow
definition of innocence. Practically, evasion of the bank reporting law
is so easy, a smurf should wonder whether it is too good to be true.
Once on notice that smurfing may be questionable, continuing ignorance of the law is blameworthy because smurfs have a duty to research
the law as they did when they investigated the bank reporting law.
On balance, ignorance of the anti-smurting law should not be a

defense to smurfing. Nonetheless, excessively cautious courts may
establish it as a defense. 1 7 The innocence and immorality of smurfing

are ambiguous, and Liparota, although a bad decision, indicates that
the Supreme Court is receptive to the defense. At a minimum, courts
may fall back on the rule of lenity to establish ignorance as a defense.
If the courts infer knowledge of illegality as an element of the offense,
they should not require actual knowledge. Rather, the government
should be able to establish mens rea by showing that the defendant
should have known the law. This latter option, really a mens rea of
negligence, is preferable to actual knowledge. 178 The Court has
suggested that this alternative is constitutionally acceptable.179 More

177. If the courts decide to allow ignorance of the law as a defense to smurfing, they would
likely do so based on principles of statutory construction rather than constitutional grounds.
Lambert revealed the Supreme Court's willingness to rely on the due process clause to establish
ignorance of the law as a defense. See supra note 158; see also United States v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1970) ("Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may
also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due
process questions if Congress did not require... 'mensrea'as to each ingredient of the offense.").
Nonetheless, the Court is unlikely to choose that approach for the anti-smurfing statute for
several reasons. First, the ordinance in Lambert is distinguishable from the anti-smurfing statute
because the former criminalized an omission to act while the latter criminalizes only the positive
conduct of structuring cash transactions. Because of this difference, the anti-smurfing statute
does not entail the same danger of lack of notice the Court found critical in Lambert.
Another indication that the Court would rely on statutory construction to establish ignorance
of the law as a defense is the Court's use of that approach in Liparota. Liparotawas explicitly
decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See United States v. Liparota, 471
U.S. 419, 431-32 (1985). As described above, the Liparota statute is most analogous to the
anti-smurfing statute. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court will
likely rely on statutory construction because it avoids constitutional questions whenever possible.
Using statutory construction, the Court has alternative grounds to reach the same result.
Although commentators have criticized the use of statutory construction to establish ignorance
of the law as a defense, see Note, supra note 152, at 1401-03, it is the approach the Court
likely will take.
178. See Note, supra note 152, at 1414-16.
179. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Court implied that a showing that
knowledge of illegality is probable satisfies the Constitution. "Where a person did not know of

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

importantly, requiring proof of actual knowledge would exceed the
legitimate boundaries of ignorance as a defense. As discussed above,
Joe has good reason to be on notice that smurfing is questionable,
thus he should have a duty to investigate the law. In this context,
Joe's lack of actual knowledge is due only to his negligence.'8 Joe
should not be allowed to assert his own negligence as a defense. And,
as a practical matter, requiring the government to prove actual knowledge of the law would make prosecution for smurfing impossible in
most cases.18'
The mens rea of negligence is a compromise between the alternatives that knowledge of illegality is irrelevant and that knowledge of
illegality must be actual. Once the Treasury Department implements
measures ensuring that bank customers are informed of the anti-smurfing law, the combination of these measures with the "should have
known" standard for knowledge of illegality will eliminate the defense
of ignorance of the law.
C.

Constitutionality

1. The Fourth Amendment
In CaliforniaBankers Association v. Shultz,m plaintiff banks and
depositors challenged the constitutionality of the bank reporting law
under the fourth amendment.'3 The Supreme Court held that the
statute did not violate the bank's fourth amendment rights, but the
Court did not decide the issue as to depositors because it concluded
that the depositors lacked standing to challenge the statute 84 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Powell expressed the view that the report-

the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he
may not be convicted consistently with due process." Id. at 229-30. Whether the Constitution
would likewise be satisfied by a showing that the defendant should have known the law is a
slightly different question. If the Constitution allows punishment of a person who "probably
knew," it should as well allow punishment of a person who "should have known."
180. Cf. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (willful blindness), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). See generally Note, supra note 152, at 1415-16 (discussing why a
purely subjective standard is undesirable).
181. See Proposed Amendment to Bank Secrecy Regulations, supranote 137, at 7948 ("[The]
problem of establishing knowledge is presenting difficulties for investigators and prosecutors
and is threatening to undermine Treasury's ability to assure compliance with [the anti-smurfing
statute]."). See generally Note, supranote 152, at 1415-16 (describing reasons mens rea should
not be limited to actual knowledge).
182. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
183. Id. at 59.
184. Id. at 67-69.
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ing law was constitutional, but stated that "[a] significant extension
of the regulations' reporting requirements ... would pose substantial
and difficult constitutional questions ....At some point, governmental
intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of
privacy."'1 5 Is the anti-smurfing statute the "significant extension" to
which Justice Powell referred?
Under current law, the anti-smurfing statute does not violate the
fourth amendment. In United States v. Miller,m the Supreme Court

held that a bank customer suffers no search or seizure when bank
records are turned over to the government. The statute breaches no

legitimate expectations of privacy because the customer voluntarily
conveys the information to the bank and assumes the risk that the
bank will turn the information over to the government. Relying heavily
on Miller, lower courts all have concluded that the bank reporting
law does not violate bank customers' fourth amendment rights.'8 Although the Court's rationale in Miller is disingenuous and deserves
reconsideration,m this article is not the place. Given the current state

of fourth amendment jurisprudence, the anti-smurfing statute does
not extend the reporting law so dramatically as to conflict with the
fourth amendment.m

185. Id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
186. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
187. See United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Richter, 610 F. Supp. 480, 492-93 (N.D. Ill.
1985), affd sub nor. United States v. Mangovski,
785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855 (1988); United States v. Sanchez Vazquez,
585 F. Supp. 990, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
188. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107 (1985) (Miller
is "highly questionable" since customer expects bank documents will remain private); C. WHITEBREAD & C.

SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS

113-14 (2d ed. 1986) (the "assumption of risk' rationale of Miller is "particularly questionable"
in light of necessity of using banking systems).
189. Smurfing rarely will occur in conjunction with a search or seizure. If a customer
successfully structures transactions so that no report is filed, no search is made because no
expectation of privacy (reasonable or otherwise) was invaded; the government and the customer
made no contact. See Richter, 610 F. Supp. at 492. ("If we assume the truth of the facts in the
indictment, we find that the defendants managed to deposit their money without triggering the
Act's reporting requirements. Thus, no search or seizure actually happened in this ease. The
defendants successfully avoided a search and are being prosecuted for doing so."). Id. If, on the
other hand, the customer does not structure transactions and the bank files a report, government
contact is present and arguably an expectation of privacy is breached, but there is no crime
because the customer did not structure transactions. Thus, while arguably there was a search,
there will be no prosecution. In that situation, the existence of a search is wholly without
criminal consequences. The final fact pattern involves a defendant who tries to structure trans-
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2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Assume that Joe has $450,000 in twenty-dollar bills he wants to
send secretly and safely to an off-shore tax haven. Prior to adoption
of the anti-smurfing statute, Joe had two options. He could get one

cashier's check and let the bank report the transaction or he could
get fifty $9000 cashier's checks at different banks and avoid a report.
The anti-smurfing statute eliminates the latter option by defining it

as a crime. 19° Arguably, the anti-smurfing statute creates a dilemma
and subtly coerces Joe into choosing the option the government prefers

self-reporting his suspicious activities. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that an odious choice may constitute compulsion for

-

purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. 191
Even assuming a compelling effect, however, the anti-smurfing
statute does not violate the privilege against self- incrimination because
the courts have concluded that reports filed under the bank reporting
law are not incriminating. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on this
issue,1 9 but the lower courts have found no incrimination because the

reporting requirement is not targeted at an inherently suspect group, 1 3
and because no direct nexus exists between the disclosure and potential

criminal activity.19 This definition of incrimination is extremely nar-

actions to evade the reporting law but fails, so the bank files a report. In this situation, the
defendant has committed the crime of attempted structuring. The bank files a report, so arguably
there is a search. This last pattern is the only one likely to include both a crime and a search,
so in only limited circumstances would the question even arise.
190. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986); cf. United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp.
686, 694 (D. Vt. 1975) (one factor lessening the danger of self-incrimination in the import/export
law is the option of avoiding reporting requirements by arranging to carry less than $5,000 at
each border crossing).
191. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563-65 (1983).
192. In California Bankers' Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 75 (1975), the Court declined to
rule because the plaintiff depositors' claims were premature.
193. United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990, 996 (N.D. Ga. 1984); cf. United
States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1979) (import/export reporting law does not
target inherently suspect group); San Juan, 405 F. Supp at 692 (same). In these cases, the
courts explained that the import/export law applied to all foreign travelers rather than a particular suspect group. In contrast, laws which have been determined to target suspect groups
include laws applying to Communists, marijuana dealers, and gamblers. See Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
194. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. at 996; cf. Dichne, 612 F.2d at 640 (import/export
reporting law has no direct link to related criminal activity); United States v. Richter, 610 F.
Supp. 480, 491-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (no standing to assert violation of privilege against self-incrimination), affd sub nom. United States v. Mangovski, 785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 855 (1988); San Juan, 405 F. Supp. at 693 (same).
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row. It contradicts Congress's express statement 95 and implicit
assumptions' 9G about large cash transactions. Filing a report brings
Joe to the government's attention as a target for criminal investigation,
and necessarily exposes him to an increased risk of prosecution. 1 7 A
critique of the courts' definition of incrimination is beyond the scope
of this article and is available elsewhere. 19s Given the current law,
however, the anti-smurfing statute does not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination regardless of its compelling effect because

the information in the reports has been deemed not incriminating.'
3.

"

Due Process

Clause (3) defines a new crime of structuring transactions to evade

the reporting requirement. One might challenge clause (3) as void for
vagueness2°° based on the verb describing the actual criminal act,
"structure." Such a challenge seems initially strong because the term

is not statutorily defined, no popular definition of the term exists, and
Congress provided no explicit statement of its intent regarding the
term.ml1 Nonetheless, the Senate Report includes an example of structuring, and the drafters' congressional testimony reveals what they
meant by the term. 2n Thus the legislative history provides some meaning to the word "structure." Even more fatal to a vagueness challenge
is the fact that "structure" developed a common law meaning before

195. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
196. See Briefing on the 1970 Currency and Foreign TransactionsReporting Act: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and UrbanAffairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52
(1985) (comments of Congressman McKinney) ("What legitimate business in the United States
of America today transfers money in cash?").
197. See United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686, 693 (D. Vt. 1975). San Juan dealt
with the importexport reporting law, but the impact of filing a report with the government is
the same for the import/export law and the bank reporting law.
198. See Comment, "Hollow Ritual[sl": The Fifth Amendment and Self ReportingSchemes,
34 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1986). See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note
188, at 340-43.
199. This conclusion assumes that it is not just the information in the reports that is
arguably incriminating, but also the identification as one to whom the law applies. Thus, the
self-incrimination claim should not depend on its assertion on the report form itself. See Comment,
supranote 198, at 479 n.54. See generally id. at 478-80 (comparing cases involving registration
forms for Communist Party membership and for income tax on income gained illegally).
200. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
202. See supranotes 125-26 (quoting legislative history and congressional testimony regarding the meaning of "structuring").
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the anti-smurfing statute was born.2 0 When a federal statute employs
a common law term without defining it, the term retains its common
law meaning. 2°4 Thus one may rely on all the cases concerning "structuring" decided under the basic reporting law when interpreting the
anti-smurfing statute. These cases clearly indicate what conduct is
criminal.205 Considered together, these sources provide a sufficiently
clear definition of "structure" to satisfy due process. 20
In summary, the anti-smurfing statute should pass constitutional
muster. This result may be attributable in part to dubious definitions
of "search" and "incrimination." Assuming no change in these definitions, the anti-smurfing statute plainly is constitutional.
D. The Unit of Prosecution
Until now the analysis has focused on the point at which Joe's
behavior triggers the anti-smurfing statute. A different question concerns the point at which Joe goes from violating the statute once to
twice or more. What is the unit of prosecution for the anti-smurfing
statute? Under clauses (1) and (2), which prohibit causing or attempting to cause a bank to fail to file or to file a faulty report, the unit
of prosecution is clear. Each time the bank ifies a bad report or fails
to file a required report constitutes one unit of prosecution. 2°7 Likewise,
each time a customer attempts to cause such a result is one unit of
prosecution.m

203. See supra note 128.
204. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).
205. See generally Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (statute
is sufficiently certain if it "employs words or phrases having . . . a well-settled common law
meaning").
206. The mens rea element bolsters, in two ways, the conclusion that the anti-smurfing
statute is not void for vagueness. First, the anti-smurfing statute requires that the defendant
act "for the purpose of evading the reporting requirement[ ]." The specificity of this mens rea
helps offset an arguably obscure actus rsus. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02
(1945). Second, knowledge of illegality may be inferred as an element of smurfing. See supra
text accompanying notes 135-81. This additional mens rea element will similarly contribute to
dispel any vagueness. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 339 (1952) (regulation requiring drivers of vehicles transporting explosives or flammable liquids to avoid, "so
far as practicable, and, where feasible" driving through congested thoroughfares, tunnels, etc.
was not invalid on the ground of vagueness where statute punished only those who knowingly
violated the regulation).
207. The point at which a bank files an incomplete or false report is obvious. As for defining
when a bank has failed to file a report that is due, the regulations establish when transactions
must be aggregated and reports must be filed. See supra text accompanying notes 74-98.
208. Defining the conduct constituting an attempt is the subject of a voluminous common
law that can be used here to define when one or more attempts have occurred.
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Under clause (3), which deals with structuring a transaction, the
unit of prosecution is more complex. Assume that each week Joe
receives about $90,000 in small bills to launder. Over the course of
the week, he goes to ten banks and buys a $9000 cashier's check at
each. This might be defined as one unit of smurfing because Joe structured one $90,000 transaction. At the other extreme, Joe's conduct
might constitute ten units of smurfing, because each time he entered
a bank, Joe structured a transaction. Or this might be defined as five
units of smurfing, because assuming that for each unit of prosecution
the aggregate amount of cash must exceed $10,000, the transactions
can be collapsed into five units of $18,000 as Joe goes from bank to
bank.
Joe's conduct is best defined as five units of smurfing. Defining
Joe's conduct as ten units of smurfing is unwise because each unit of
prosecution requires over $10,000 in order for the government to prove
that Joe intended to evade the reporting requirement. 209 Defining Joe's

conduct as one unit of smurfing is equally unwise because it relies
arbitrarily on a one-week period. Using a time period is problematic
because the usual situation will involve converting a continuing cash
flow; thus any time period selected will be arbitrary. More importantly,
the number of units of prosecution should relate to the amount of
money smurfed rather than an arbitrarily selected time period. Focusing on the amount of money smurfed ensures that liability is commensurate with harm and culpability. Focusing on the amount of money
smurfed also renders liability consistent from case-to-case.
Courts interpreting other federal crimes have tended to find multiple units of prosecution.210 Using $10,000 to define the unit of prosecu-

209. The anti-smurfing statute does not by its terms require the presence of $10,000 for
each unit of prosecution. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986). As a practical matter, however,
if less than $10,000 is involved, no report is due, and the government will not have the chance
to prove that the defendants acted for the purpose of evading reports. See supra note 125
(splitting up $2,000 is not smurfing). In the example with Joe, assuming the transactions were
at different banks, neither bank is under a duty to aggregate, so no reports were due. Joe
might still be liable for structuring, but interpreting the ten transactions individually as ten
separate crimes of structuring is inconsistent with the purpose of evasion. Only if the transactions
are reconstructed and examined as a whole can the government establish that the defendants
acted with the purpose of evading reports. The government often will find this impossible.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
mail fraud statute unit of prosecution to be each use of mails although only one fraudulent
scheme was involved); United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1962) (interpreting
Hobbs Act unit of prosecution to be each payment in an extortion scheme even if payments
occur during continuance of the same underlying conditions); United States v. Teemer, 214 F.
Supp. 952, 958 (D.W. Va. 1963) (interpreting Travel Act unit of prosecution to be each use of
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tion furnishes a reasonably bright line. The $10,000 line is certain and
therefore predictable; it avoids extensive litigation over the definition
of the unit of prosecution.
E. Anti-Smutrfing Applied
Investigation of smurfing will be difficult. If a smurf structures
transactions so that no reports are filed, the government will have to
discover the conduct in some other way. Most discoveries will not
result from an investigation targeting smurfing. Accidental discoveries
of smurfing surely will occur, but probably not routinely.
Prosecution of smurfing also appears difficult because the government must prove that the defendant structured transactions for the
purpose of evading the reporting requirement. Forcing the government to prove motive is onerous. 211 As a practical matter, however,

this burden may not be that difficult. Once the government introduces
evidence that the defendant engaged in a series of cash transactions,
each of which was at or below $10,000, the jury will likely conclude
that the defendant intended to avoid reporting. The defendant then
must offer some other explanation for his transactions, and a convincing explanation for multiple cash transactions may be difficult to compose.
Regardless of its practical operation, the anti-smurfing statute has
a symbolic aspect as well. Societal concern over structuring may be
assuaged by this congressional response. Moreover, this particular
type of response is significant in that Congress created an entirely
new crime rather than amending existing statutes and regulations.
The new crime signals a legislative commitment to eradicate money
laundering. From this perspective, the statute is important symbolically, its efficacy notwithstanding.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ANTI-SMURFING STATUTE TO
OTHER FEDERAL CRIMES

The federal criminal law lacks an organizing principle. It is not a
code, but rather an assortment of unrelated crimes accumulated over
the years. One result of this approach is that the interaction between

an interstate facility and each act of interstate travel although only one underlying scheme)
(cited with approval in United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 898 (9th Cir. 1974)). See generally
Thomas, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1, 12-25 (1985).
211. The anti-smurfing statute is unusual in requiring the government to prove the defendant's motive. Motive is rarely an element of crimes; generally the government must prove that
defendants intended to do the prohibited act but not why they did it.
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crimes is often unanticipated and complex. This section explores relationships between the anti-smurfing statute and other federal crimes.
A.

A Comprehensive Reporting Scheme

The bank reporting statute that the anti-smurfing statute aids and
abets is part of a comprehensive scheme of reporting laws that captures
all large cash transactions. The bank reporting statute is only one of
three reporting statutes. 212 The others are 31 U.S.C. § 5316, which
requires each person to report the import or export of more than
$10,000 in monetary instruments at one time, 2 13 and 26 U.S.C. § 60501,
which requires any person who receives more than $10,000 in cash in
the course of trade or business in one transaction or in related transactions to file a return. 214 Collectively, these statutes cover all large
cash transactions and require that the government be informed of
them.2 1 r Thus, the government receives a report if Joe takes more
than $10,000 cash and conducts any financial transaction, sends the
cash out of the country, or invests it in diamonds. 21 6 These laws were
21 7
the government's first sortie against money laundering.

B.

The Ripple Effect

Although federal criminal laws largely are unrelated, some crimes
and sanctions depend on a combination of predicate offenses. There212. In addition, two new statutes authorize the Secretary to adopt expanded reporting
requirements. See supra note 104.
213. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides:
[A] person . . . shall file a report. . . when the person... knowingly. . . (1)
transports [or] is about to transport . . . monetary instruments of more than
$10,000 at one time... from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States; or ... to a place in the United States from or through
a place outside the United States; or (2) receives monetary instruments of more
than $10,000 at one time transported into the United States from or through a
place outside the United States.
214. 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. IV 1986) provides: "Any person... who is engaged in a
trade or business, and . . . who, in the course of such trade or business, receives more than
$10,000 in cash in 1 transaction (or [two] or more related transactions), shall make [a] return
... with respect to such transaction . .. ."
215. The three statutes operate today as a comprehensive scheme but Congress did not
enact them as one. The bank reporting law and the import/export report law were enacted in
1970 and § 60501 was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
146(a), 98 Stat. 685 (1984) (enacting § 60501); Pub. L. No. 91-508, §8 221-23, 231, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
216. Reinvesting the cash in a criminal enterprise may violate RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1982).
217. Today this indirect approach is joined by a direct approach in the form of statutes
defining money laundering per se as a crime. See id. 88 1956-57 (Supp. IV 1986).
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fore, the birth of a new federal crime has a ripple effect. The antismurfing statute has made ripples by providing for enhanced sanctions
when it is violated in combination with any other law of the United
States.218 Thus, a person convicted of structuring and any other federal
crime is subject to more severe sanctions than a person convicted only
of structuring. Congress also has included the anti-smurfing statute
as a predicate offense for two other crimes, RICO 219 and the Travel
Act.220 A person chargeable under the anti-smurfing statute also is
more likely liable for RICO and Travel Act violations.
In contrast, one criminal provision declines to rely on the antismurfing statute as a predicate offense. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957,
conducting a monetary transaction in property derived from specified
unlawful activity is defined as criminal.221 Violations of the anti-smurfing statute and the bank reporting law do not constitute "specified
unlawful activity,"222 so the anti-smurfing statute does not contribute
to a violation of section 1957.
C.

Double Jeopardy and the Anti-Smurfing Statute

In some situations, the double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition
of multiple punishment in a single trial. The relationship between the
anti-smurfing statute and its predecessors must be defined to assure
a coherent approach when the double jeopardy issues reach the courts.
1. The Bank Reporting Statute
The bank reporting law overlaps with the anti-smurfing statute so
that often, both statutes define the same conduct as criminal. Clause
(1) of the anti-smurfing statute prohibits causing a bank to fail to file
a report. As noted above, some circuits hold customers liable for
failure to file under the bank reporting law as accomplices of the
223
banks, while others hold that customers are not liable as accomplices.
Clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute prohibits causing a bank to file

218. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (Supp. IV 1986), which states, in pertinent part:
A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this
subchapter... while violating another law of the United States or as part of a
pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period,
shall be fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or
both.
219. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
220. Id. § 1952 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
221. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957 (West Supp. 1989).
222. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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a report with an omission or misstatement of fact. The bank reporting
statute covers the same conduct in that it prohibits any false, fictitious,
or fraudulent statement in a report.224 Unlike the failure to file situation, courts have never hesitated to apply this part of the reporting
law to customers.2 Clause (3) of the anti-smurfing statute prohibits
structuring transactions. Some circuits interpret the bank reporting
law, coupled with the general accomplice liability statute, to reach
some types of structuring on the theory that the customer caused the
bank to fail to file.226 Jurisdictions that have adopted this theory of
the bank reporting law only apply it to transactions structured within
certain limits.2 Moreover, the bank reporting statute never directly
prohibits structuring transactions. Rather, it only prohibits a particular result - failure to fie. Some overlap exists between clause (3)
and the bank reporting law, but it is minimal.
In the circuits in which customers are liable as accomplices under
the bank reporting law, are they now also liable under the anti-smurfing statute? If the same conduct violates two statutes, then double
jeopardy bars multiple punishment unless Congress has authorized
multiple punishment.2 28 The existence of statutory authorization depends on congressional intent. If Congress intended that there be only
one offense, then the double jeopardy clause bars multiple punishment.
But if Congress intended to create multiple offenses, then statutory
2 29
authorization exists and multiple punishment is allowed.
The relevant inquiry is whether Congress intended for customers
to be liable under both the bank reporting law and the anti-smurfing
statute. With regard to the crimes of causing failure to fie and structuring transactions under clauses (1) and (3) of the anti-smurfing stat-

224. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(d) (1988) (quoted supra note 111).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 629 & n.2 (11th Cir.) (false information
in reports would violate reporting law) & 631 (conspiracy to submit false reports), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 847 (1984).
226.

See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

227.

See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.

228. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985).
229. See id.; cf. Thomas, The Prohibitionof Successive Prosecutionsfor the Same Offense:
In Search of a Definition, 71 IowA L. REv. 323, 340-42 (1986) (concluding that a broader

double jeopardy protection exists against successive trials than against multiple punishments in
a single trial). According to Professor Thomas, legislative authorization of multiple punishments
does not answer whether the double jeopardy clause permits successive trials. See id. at 370-75.
The successive trial test that Professor Thomas develops is predicated on the underlying conduct
rather than the Blockburger analysis of the statutory elements. See id. at 382-88 (relying principally on Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)). If this position is correct, my conclusion that

multiple punishment is permissible should be limited to the context of a single trial.
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ute, Congress did not explicitly state its intent. However, the legislative history of the anti-smurfing statute indicates that the purpose of
the statute was not to impose multiple punishment on customers, but
rather to change the law in some circuits to ensure that customers
were liable.2 0 The anti-smurfing statute ensures customer liability and
makes the law consistent nationwide. Nothing indicates that Congress
intended to establish two separate offenses to increase punishment.
Clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute is slightly different. The
legislative history reveals that the main problems with the reporting
law were customers causing failure to file and structuring transactions.m1 Congress addressed these two problems when it drafted
clauses (1) and (3) of the anti-smurfing statute. The legislative history
mentions liability for incomplete or false statements under clause (2)
only once; a government witness explained that clause (2) of the antismurfing statute is a "restatement" of liability for false statements
under the bank reporting statute and 18 U.S.C. § 1001.M 2 The word

230. See HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, supra
note 5, at 22, 30 (anti-smurfing law meant to cure inadequacies in current law in three federal
circuits); id. at 48-49 (proposed anti-smurfing law corrects the problems revealed in case law);
id. at 67 (anti-smurfing statute should close money laundering "loophole"; anti-smurfing statute
"needed as prosecutions . . . continue to suffer from adverse case law"; anti-smurfing statute
"should help clarify the state of the law and permit continued vigorous prosecution"); id. at 92
(anti-smurfing statute will cure confusion caused by case law and preclude unjustified dismissals);
id. at 95 (anti-smurfing statute is designed to cure shortcomings in Bank Secrecy Act); id. at
134-36 (case law has created two major gaps in reporting law that anti-smurfing law should
overcome); id. at 226 (anti-smurfing law is designed to overcome several recent court decisions);
HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at
792 (anti-smurfing statute is aimed at overcoming problems of structured transactions caused
by recent cases); id. at 846 (describing recent case law as a severe blow to government efforts
to use reporting requirements).
231. See HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housingand Urban Affairs, supra
note 5, at 22, 30 (testimony of Francis A. Keating II, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement,
Department of the Treasury) ('The [anti-smurfing law] would make a person who structures
transactions to avoid the currency reporting requirements, or who causes a financial institution
not to file a required report, subject to the criminal and civil sanctions of the Bank Secrecy
Act."). Note that false statements are not mentioned, only failure to file and structuring. See
also id. at 48-49 (description of anti-smurfing statute as it applies to structuring); id. at 55
(description of anti-smurfing law as it applies to causing failure to file); id. at 67 ('The [anti-smurfing statute] is needed as prosecutions based upon 'structured' transactions and the 'causing' of
financial institutions to fail to file currency transaction reports continue to suffer from adverse
case law.") (prepared statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp). Again,
false statements are not mentioned, only failure to file and structuring.
232. 'This new language is, in part, a restatement of the law of causation found in 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) and 31 U.S.C. § 5313, and the law pertaining to the intentional making of false
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"restatement" is ambiguous, but it does not necessarily imply additional liability. Regardless of the meaning of "restatement," references
throughout the legislative history indicate that the purpose of the
anti-smurfing statute was to cure problems with the reporting law by
closing its loopholes.us
All evidence indicates Congress intended the anti-smurfing statute
to tighten the reporting law rather than to define additional crimes
to increase punishment. This consistent evidence of congressional intent makes it unnecessary to resort to the Blockburger-3 test of statutory construction.2 3 Because Congress did not intend to impose multiple punishment, statutory authorization for multiple punishment is
missing; punishment under both laws would therefore violate the double jeopardy clause.
2. Section 1001
Section 1001 deems it criminal when, within the jurisdiction of any
government agency, a person intentionally conceals a material fact by
trick, scheme, or device; makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement; or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing

statements... codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1001." Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 67 (prepared statement of Deputy Assistant
Attorney General James Knapp).
233. See supra note 230; see also HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and UrbanAffairs, supra note 5, at 62 (anti-smurfing statute as "closing the loopholes" created
by case law); id. at 95 (anti-smurfing statute designed to "cure" shortcomings in Bank Secrecy
Act).
234. United States v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). For a discussion of the Blockburger
text, see infra text accompanying notes 250-58.
235. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 780-81 (1985); Albernaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1981); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-16 (1977). At any rate,
the reporting law and clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute would likely fail the Blockburger
test and would therefore be deemed the "same" offense. As Woodward makes clear, the
Blockburgertest is not applied to the facts of the case but to the words of the statute. See United
States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 106, 108 (1985). Thus a more accurate phrasing of the Blockburger
test might be that each crime may be established by proof of a fact the other does not require.
Applied to the reporting law and clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute, the anti-smurfing
statute does not necessarily prove a reporting violation because one can violate the anti-smurfing
statute by merely attempting to file a false statement. Conversely, though, it is difficult to
imagine how one could prove a "false, fictitious or fraudulent statement.., in [a] report" under
the reporting law without necessarily proving a false report under clause (2) of the anti-smurfing
statute. Because violation of the reporting law could never be proved without establishing a
violation of clause (2), the reporting law does not require proof of a fact the anti-smurfing law
does not. Thus, these two offenses may be deemed the same offense under Blockburger.
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it has a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement.2 This statute overlaps with the anti-smurfing statute in several ways.
Clause (1) of the anti-smurfing statute prohibits causing a bank to
fail to file a currency transaction report. The circuits are split on
whether section 1001, coupled with the general accomplice liability
statute, reaches this conduct.3 7 In the circuits that hold section 1001
applicable, one who causes a bank to fail to report is liable both under
section 1001 and clause (1) of the anti-smurfing statute.m
Clause (2) of the anti-smurfing statute makes it a crime to cause
a bank to file a report with a material omission or misstatement.
Unlike the failure to file situation in which some courts held that
section 1001 did not apply, the applicability of section 1001 to incomplete or false filings always was clear.2 9 Causing a false filing necessarily would violate section 1001,2 ° and causing an incomplete filing
would violate section 1001 if the defendant used a trick, scheme, or
device.241
Clause (3) of the anti-smurfing statute prohibits structuring transactions. Clause (3) and section 1001 overlap only slightly. Some courts
hold that section 1001 reaches conduct also covered under clause (3),
but only when the customer causes the bank to fail to reportYm In
any other situation, section 1001 does not reach the conduct and does
not overlap the anti-smurfing statute.
In circuits holding section 1001 applicable, would a person be liable
both under section 1001 and the anti-smurfing statute? As noted above,
the double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishment in a single
trial unless Congress intended such a result. 2 As for causing failure
to file, some evidence supports the conclusion that Congress did not
intend the anti-smurfing statute and section 1001 to impose multiple
punishment. Section 1001 was in place when Congress enacted the

236. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
237. Compare United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1312 (2d Cir.) (defendant could
have been held liable under § 1001 had he been charged), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987)
and United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant liable under §
1001) with United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1986) (defendant not liable under §
1001); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986) (same) and United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985) (same).
238. See Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1311-12; Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096-1101.
239. See supra note 114.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 113.
242. See supra note 238.
243. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
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anti-smurfing statute, m and courts were split over the former's
applicability to failure to file situations. The legislative history of the
anti-smurfing statute indicates that the purpose of the statute was
not to add another layer of liability, but to ensure customer liability
in the circuits holding other laws, including section 1001, inapplica15
ble.
But one also can argue that Congress did intend to impose multiple
punishment under the anti-smurfing statute and section 1001. When
Congress passed the original reporting laws in 1970, it also passed a
statute describing one aspect of the relationship between section 1001
and bank reports.?6 This statute indicated that Congress contemplated
247
that section 1001 would apply to bank filings and failures to fle.
Although Congress later repealed this statute, the repeal only
strengthens this argument, because Congress explained that the statute was unnecessary due to the obvious applicability of section 1001.m
Therefore, Congress recognized this impact of section 1001 and in-

tended it to apply to filing or failing to fie reports. Congress surely
knew that clause (1) of the anti-smurfing statute would impose multiple
49
punishment in the circuits holding section 1001 applicable.?
Because of the conflicting evidence of congressional intent in the
legislative history, the Blockburger test ° defines congressional in-

244. Congress adopted the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in 1918. Act of Oct. 23, 1918,
ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015. See generally United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 70-74 (1984) (the
1918 Act was first federal criminal statute prohibiting making a false statement).
245. See supra note 230; see also Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, supra note 5, at 67 ('CThis restatement of the applicability of [§ 1001] to
the Bank Secrecy Act was believed necessary following the decision of the First Circuit in
Anzalone.. . .") (prepared statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp).
246. See 31 U.S.C. § 1052(k) (1976) (repealed 1982).
247. The statute provided: 'For the purposes of section 1001 of Title 18 ... the contents
of reports required under any provision of this chapter are statements and representations in
matters within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States." Id. Although the statute
does not mention failure to file, it presumably covered those situations as well.
248. The statute was repealed as "[ulnnecesary" because "Section 1001 applies unless otherwise provided." H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 301, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1895, 2195; see United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 110 n.6 (1985).
249. The Supreme Court relied on a similar congressional intent argument in Woodward,
469 U.S. at 105. The Woodward Court cited the fact that in passing the import/export law,
Congress's attention was called to § 1001. Id. at 109. Therefore, the Court stated, one cannot
assume that Congress was unaware that there were two offenses. Id. Here, in passing the
anti-smurfing statute, Congress's attention was similarly drawn to § 1001. See supra notes
246-47. Again, one cannot assume Congress was unaware of the existence of two offenses.
250.

See United States v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

tent.' 1 This statutory construction test provides that Congress intended to define separate crimes if each crime requires proof of a fact
that the other does not.2sa The Supreme Court has applied this test
to a situation analogous to the anti-smurfing law and section 1001. In
United States v. Woodward,an the defendant made a false statement
in a report required under the import/export reporting statute.2

He

was convicted of violating that statute and section 1001. The Supreme
Court applied the Blockburger test and concluded that the statutes
defined separate crimes because each required proof of a fact the other
did not.2- The Court reasoned that proof of a reporting violation does
not necessarily include proof of a section 1001 violation, because section
1001 requires proof of a fact the reporting statute does not, a "trick,
scheme, or device."2 Conversely, section 1001 does not necessarily
include proof of an import/export reporting violation.- 7 Therefore, Congress intended to define separate crimes and to authorize cumulative
punishment.m
The Woodward analysis requires the same result when the
Blockburger test is applied to the anti-smurfing statute and section
1001. Proof of an anti-smurfing clause (1) violation does not necessarily
include proof of a section 1001 violation because section 1001 requires
proof of either a false statement or concealment via trick, scheme, or
device. In contrast, clause (1) requires only that the person cause the
bank to fail to file; presumably this could be accomplished without a
trick, scheme, or device. Even assuming that a trick, scheme, or device
would be required to successfully cause a bank to fail to file,259 clause

(1) also prohibits attempts to cause a bank to fail to file. Clearly a

251.
252.
253.
254.
panying
255.

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779-80 (1985).
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
469 U.S. 105 (1985).
Id. at 106; see 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (described supra text accomnote 213).
Woodward, 469 U.S. at 108.

256. Id.
257.
258.
259.
ignoring

Id. at 107 n.3.
Id. at 108-10.
This might be required as a practical matter, but the Supreme Court is capable of
practical matters. In Woodward, it relied on the possibility that persons going through

customs might not be asked whether they were carrying enough currency to require a report.
See infra note 260. This is theoretically possible but extremely unlikely, because everyone

passing through customs is presented with forms that ask whether the traveler is carrying over
$10,000. See, e.g., United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing Customs
Declaration Cards). See generally N. AnRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 574 n.3 (1986).
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person could attempt to cause a bank to fail to file without necessarily
violating section 1001. For example, Joe could conduct three transactions of $4000 each in one day at a single bank, and just stand silently
rather than volunteer information indicating a report is due. Without
some affirmative trick, scheme, or device like false identities, the bank
would probably discover the situation and file a report. Nonetheless,
Joe would have violated clause (1) by attempting to cause a failure to
file. However, because he used no trick, scheme, or device, he would
not have violated section 1001. The Supreme Court relied on an analogous rationale in Woodward to hold it possible to violate the import/export reporting law without violating section 1001.26 Accordingly, clause
(1) and section 1001 pass the Blockburger test as separate crimes and
multiple punishment is authorized.261
A slightly different question is whether Congress intended the
anti-smurfing statute and section 1001 to define multiple crimes for
incomplete and false filings. The legislative history of the anti-smurfing
statute does not explicitly address this point.26 The argument made
above in support of multiple punishment for failure to file under clause
(1) of the anti-smurfing statute and section 1001 likewise would apply
to incomplete and false filings. The statute passed in 1970 and repealed
in 1982 indicates that Congress intended section 1001 to apply to bank
reports.2 63 Courts never doubted the applicability of section 1001 to
incomplete and false fdlings.26 4Thus, when Congress adopted the antismurfmg statute in 1986, it must have known that the impact of clause
(2) would be to impose another layer of liability in addition to section
1001. One can infer that Congress intended this result.
This evidence of congressional intent on causing the filing of an
incomplete or false report under clause (2) indicates that Congress

260. The Woodward Court stated:
A person could, without employing a "tick, scheme, or device," simply and willfully
fail to file a currency disclosure report. A traveler who enters the country and
passes through Customs prepared to answer questions truthfully, but is never
asked whether he is carrying over [$10,000] in currency, might nonetheless be
subject to conviction under [the import/export report law] for willfully transporting
money without filing the required currency report. However, because he did not
conceal a material fact by means of a "trick, scheme, or device," (and did not make
any false statement) his conduct would not fall within... § 1001.
Id.
261. See supra note 229 for an argument limiting successive trials even when multiple
punishment is authorized.
262. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 114.
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intended to establish multiple liability. Unlike the situation described
above for failure to file, the evidence of congressional intent on false
and incomplete filings is unambiguous. Thus resort to the Blockburger
test is unnecessary. Yet if the Blockburger test were applied to clause
(2) and section 1001, the conclusion that the statutes define separate
crimes would be the same. The analysis would be the same as that
used for failure to ifie. Clause (2) and section 1001 pass the Blockburger
test because each requires proof of a fact the other does not. Clause
(2) includes attempts and section 1001 includes a trick, scheme, or
device. Either way, the conclusion is that multiple punishment does
not violate the double jeopardy clause because Congress authorized it.
3. Conspiracy
The interaction between the anti-smurfing statute and the conspiracy statute2 is less complex. As with the laws above, the circuits
are split. Some circuits allow prosecution of bank customers for conspiracy to violate the reporting law,26 while others do not. 26 In circuits
in which customers are liable for conspiracy to violate the reporting
law, are they also liable under the anti-smurfing statute? The answer
again depends on whether Congress intended to impose multiple liability.
The legislative history contains no direct evidence of congressional
intent with regard to conspiracy liability, but one can infer the intent
to allow multiple punishment from several factors. Conspiracy is an
old and notorious crime 26 of which Congress surely was aware when

265. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), which provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1309-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 357 (1987); United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 847
(1984). See generally Mann, The Bank Secrecy Act: ConspiratorialLiability for Structured
Transactions, WHrrE COLLAR CRImE REP.July-Aug. 1987, at 2, 9.
267. See, e.g., United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986).
268. Congress enacted the conspiracy statute in 1909 and revised it in 1948. See Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 37, 37 Stat. 1096 (enacting statute); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat. 701 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (amended version)). Since that time it has been
used and debated frequently. See generally Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in
Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925 (1977) (judges, practicing attorneys, and scholars
have had a "love-hate" relationship with conspiracy throughout this century).
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it adopted the anti-smurfing statute. That Congress said nothing about
conspiracy suggests approval of its application in addition to the new
anti-smurftng offense.2 9 This conclusion is strengthened further by
the evidence of how Congress treated section 1001. First, Congress
adopted a statute indicating that section 1001 applied to currency
transaction reports, then it repealed the statute and explained that
section 1001 applies unless otherwise provided.2 0° Surely Congress intended that the conspiracy statute similarly would apply unless otherwise provided, and Congress made no other provision. Finally, conspiracy does not merge with a completed substantive offense under federal law,21 on the theory that the crime of conspiracy targets harms
distinct from the substantive offense. 2 Congress knew of this established rule and chose by its silence to endorse multiple liability, the
usual interaction between a substantive crime and conspiracy.
These factors indicate that Congress intended the anti-smurfing
statute and the conspiracy statute to define separate offenses; this is
sufficient evidence of congressional intent to render the Blockburger
test inapplicable. At any rate, that test only corroborates the conclusion that Congress intended to authorize multiple crimes.an
In summary, the anti-smurfing statute authorizes multiple punishment with section 1001 and with the conspiracy statute but not with
the bank reporting law. This conclusion effects rather than offends
congressional intent. Congress meant for the anti-smurfing statute to
reinforce the underlying reporting law by closing its loopholes, not by
imposing additional punishment. Section 1001 and conspiracy are sepa-

269. The Court relied on a similar rationale in Woodward. In that case, the Court stated
that in passing the import/export reporting law, Congress's attention had been drawn to § 1001,
and its subsequent silence could not be interpreted to mean that Congress was unaware that
it created two offenses and authorized multiple punishment. United States v. Woodward, 469
U.S. 105, 109 (1985). In passing the anti-smurfing statute, Congress's attention was not specifically drawn to conspiracy, but we must assume that Congress was aware of the statute. Thus
silence accompanying the anti-smurfing statute with regard to conspiracy can only indicate that
Congress intended two separate offenses.
270. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
271. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
272. The primary justification is that collective action presents a greater risk to society
than individual action and so warrants punishment in addition to that imposed for the substantive
crime. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
273. Conspiracy and the anti-smurfing statute pass the Blockburger test because each requires proof of a fact the other does not. Conspiracy requires proof of plurality, and the antismurfing statute requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of evading the cash
transaction reporting law.
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rate crimes directed at distinct evils, unrelated to the anti-smurfing
statute. 4 If the elements of those crimes happen to be met when the
anti-smurfing statute is violated, then multiple evils are present and
multiple punishment is appropriate. This is not the case, however,
between the anti-smurfing statute and the bank reporting law. Those
laws are closely related and are aimed at the same harms. They should
not be used to pyramid liability.? 5
V.

CONCLUSION

The anti-smurfing statute resulted from two determined forces
converging: the incredibly lucrative drug trade in the United States,
and the relentless effort of Congress to halt money laundering and
contain the underlying drug trade.
The reporting law scheme was the government's first attack on
money laundering. A central part of this scheme is the bank reporting
law. When the bankers, prosecutors, and Joes of the world began to
notice it, this legislation had an unpredicted consequence - the birth
of smurfs. The bank reporting law experienced considerable difficulty
in the courts. Soon the case law blossomed into gaudy disarray, and
smurfs only occasionally were threatened. Congress quickly adopted
the anti-smurfing statute.
The implicit message of the anti-smurfing statute is that no legitimate reason exists to keep large cash transactions secret. The very
existence of the transactions is suspect; the bank reporting law acknowledges this. The anti-smurfing statute establishes that avoidance
of the reporting law is unjustified. Reporting involves little time and
negligible costs. The reports impose slightly on privacy, but weighed
against the magnitude of damage that drugs and money laundering

274.

See United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 109 (1985) (congressional intent to

allow separate punishment is shown by fact that statutes are directed at separate evils) (quoting
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)). Clearly the anti-smurfing law, § 1001,

and conspiracy target separate evils. The anti-smurfing statute was designed to cure the problems
with the reporting law, thus enabling it to operate effectively against money laundering. See
supra note 230. Section 1001 was designed "to protect the authorized functions of governmental

departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices
described." See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (quoted in Woodward, 469
U.S. at 109). The conspiracy statute is designed to deter collective action. See supra note 272.

275. At any rate, the government has plenty of weapons in its arsenal. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b),
discussed supra text accompanying note 218, provides for enhanced sanctions when the antismurfing statute is violated with any other federal law. Therefore the availability of sections
1001 and 371 for prosecution with the anti-smurfing law increases the government's power
beyond merely the sanctions allowed by multiple counts.
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cause in our country, the reduction in privacy that the anti-smurfing
statute causes is warranted. The only other reason to resist these
reports is to hide other crime, either in generating the cash or in tax
fraud. This objection to reporting is entitled to no weight and is accorded none.
One of the difficulties of curbing manipulation of the bank reporting
law is drafting a law that is broad enough to be effective yet limited
enough to avoid abuse. The anti-smurfing statute includes several
guarantees against abuse. The mens rea requirement directs the government to prove the defendant acted with the motive of evading the
bank reporting law. Smurfing is not totally innocent conduct, so criminal liability should not catch our friend Joe by surprise. Even so,
under Liparota, the courts may infer knowledge of illegality as an
element and thereby protect even further against abuse. Besides the
integral role of mens rea, the anti-smurfing statute should be interpreted to incorporate other controls on abuse. First, the unit of prosecution should be defined to avoid undue proliferation of counts. Second, courts should define the relationship between the anti-smurfing
statute and other federal crimes to allow multiple punishment with
section 1001 and conspiracy, but not with the bank reporting law.
Adopting these positions minimizes the danger of abuse.
The efficacy of the anti-smurfing statute in stenning the tide of
laundered dollars is hard to predict. Investigation will be difficult
because smurfs easily can obscure structured transactions. Prosecution
also will be difficult, primarily because the government must prove the
defendant's motive to evade the reporting law, although as a practical
matter, this burden may shift to the defendant. Regardless of its
efficacy, the adoption of a new crime also has symbolic importance in
that it formally expresses society's condemnation of that conduct.
Nonetheless, the symbolic importance of a crime is a not a sufficient
justification for its existence. The law must confront reality; it cannot
lapse into an intricate but irrelevant set of rules to be treated contemptuously and avoided as if in a cartoon. The anti-smurfing statute is a
positive step to avoid that result.
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APPENDIX

4789

Form
(Rev December1985)

Currency Transaction Report

OMB No 1545-0183

File a separate report for each transaction.
0, Pleasetypeorprint.
01 For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see page 3.
Department ofthe Treasury
Internal Revenue Servce
(Complete all applicableparts-See instructions)
Identity of individual who conducted this transaction with the financial institution
1 If multiple individuals involved, see instructions and check here ......
.....................
1'

2 Last name

3 First name

4 Middle initial

6 Address (number and street)
9 State

12 Method usedtoverify identity:
b Issued by D
13 Reason items 2-12 are not completed.
b n Mail deposit/shipment

10 ZIP code

.

....
.
5 Social security number

11 Country (if not U.S.)

cNumber b
aol Armored car service (enter name) lo
c E] Night depositor ATM transaction d El Multipletransactions(seeistructions)

Individual or organization for whom this transaction was completed
..................
17 Middle initial

.
18 Social security number

b Checkif: (1) El-broker/dealer insecurities, or
20 Employer identification nu
(2) El financial institution (see instructions)
22 Occupation, profession, or business

19 a Name of organization
21 Address (number and street)
23 City

I

. .

a Describe 10

14 Ifmultiple individuals or organizations are involved, see instructions and check here .....
15 Individual's last name
16 First name

27

here.

7 Occupation, profession, or business

8 City

" l

Expires. 10.3 188
Ifamended report, set
instructons and checl,

24 State

25 ZIPcode

IMiI Customer's account number(s) affected by transaction
5E] Savings
.
T El Securities •
c E] Checking •o
L [] Loan •

26 Country (if not U.S.)

E] CD/Moneymarket I
0 ] Other(specify) •
H

'irType of transaction. Check applicable boxes to describe transactions

28 [] Currency exchange (currency for currency)
29 CASH IN:
F E] CD/Money market purchased

lDDeposit

E
P El
G

HE]

Forwiretransfer

Security purchased

AE] Receipt from abroad

Check purchased

KrEl

30 CASH OUT:

c
T

Othercash in (specify) No
-----------

El
El

w

[]

I

Checkcashed
Security redeemed
Withdrawal

CD/Money market redeemed

UEl From wire transfer

E[]

Shipmentabroad

YE] Othercashout(specify) II...

31 Total amount of currency transaction (in U.S.
dollars). .10- $

32 Amount in Item 31 in $10D bills or higher 33 Dateof transaction (month, day, and year)
1
$1
34 IfotherthanU S. currencyisinvolved. pleasefurnishthefollowinginformation: a Exchangemade [] foror E] from U.S. currency
b Currency name
c Country
d Total amount of each foreign currency (in U.
dollars) . . No'$
II
35 If acheck or wire transfer was involved in this transaction, please furnish the following information (see instructions):
a If more than one check or wire transfer is involved, see instructions and check here ......
..................
b Date of check or wire transfer
c Amount of check or wire transfer (in U.S. d Payee
dollars)

$1
e Drawer of check

I f Drawee bank and MICR number
17rMl~ Financial institution where currency transaction took place
36 Check applicable box to indicate type of financial institution
b ] Savings and loan association
cE] Creditunion
37 Name of financial institution

a El Bank (enter code number from instructions here) • ........
d E] Security broker/dealer
e El Other
138 Employer identification n

39 Address (number and street)
41 City

40 Social security number
42 State

43 ZIPcode

44 MICR number

45 Signature (preparer)

46 Title

47 Date

48 Type or print preparer's name

49 Approving official (signature)

50 Date

Sign
Here
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Multiple Transactions

(Complete applicable parts below if box 1,14,or35a on page 1 ischecked)

Continued-Complete if box Ion page I is checked
st name

j3 First name

4 Middle initial

dress (numberand street)

7 Occupation, profession, or business

Y

9 State

.thod used to verify identity:
Issued by

a Describe •

stname

3 First name

10 ZIP code

.

.

.

11 Country (if not U.S.)

c'Number

5 Social security number

7 Occupation, profession, or business

y

9 State

thod used to verify identity:
Issued by •

a Describe •

1o ZlPcode

11 Country(if not U.S.)

cNumber •

0] Continued-Complete if box 14 on page I is checked
lividual's last name
16 First name

17 Middle initial 18 Socialsecurity number

b Check if: (1)E] broker/dealer in securities, or
20 Employer identification number
(2) [] financial institution (see instructions)
22 Occupation, profession, or business

Name of organization
dress (numberand street)
y

24 State

ividual's last name

16 First name

25 ZIP code

26 Country (if not U.S.)

17 Middle initial

18 Social security number

b Check if: (1)E] broker/dealer insecurities, or
20 Employer identification number
(2)E[] financial institution (see instructions)
22 Occupation, profession. or business

Name of organization
Iress (numberand street)

24 State

25 ZIPcode

Continued-Complete If box 35a on age 1 is checked
)ate of check orwire transfer
c Amountof check or wiretransfer (inU.S.
dollars)
)rawer of check

26 Country (if not U.S.)

d Payee

f Drawee bankand MICR number

C Amount of check or wire transfer (inU.S. Id Payee
dollars)

$
)rawer of check

...

4 Middle initial

dress (number and street)

)ate of check or wire transfer

5 Socialsecurity number

t

rwebnk and MICR number
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Form4789 (Rev 12-85)

General Instructions
Note: Beginning with this revision, file Form
4789 with the IRS Data Center in Detroit.
See When and Where to File below.
Paperwork Reduction Act Notice.-The
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 says we
must tell taxpayers why we are collecting
this information, how we will use it, and
whether you have to give it to us.
The requested information is useful in
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations.
In addition to directing the Federal
Government's attention to unusual or
questionable transactions, the reporting
requirement discourages the use of
currency in illegal transactions. Financial
institutions are required to provide the
information under 31 CFR 103.22. 103.26,
and 103.27.
Who Must File.-Each financial institution
other than a casino must file a Form 4789
for each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of
currency, or other payment or transfer, by,
through, or to the financial institution.
which involves a transaction in currency of
more than $10,000. Multiple transactions
by or for any person which in any one day
total more than $10,000 should be treated
as a single transaction, if the financial
institution is aware of them.
Exemptions.-See 31 CFR 103.22(b) for
exemptions from the filing requirements by
banks on certain customers.
When and Where to File.-File this form
by the 15th day after the date of the
transaction with the Internal Revenue
Service Data Center, P.O. Box 32621.
Detroit, M1 48232 ATTN: CTR, or hand
carry it to your local IRS office. Keep a copy
of each Form 4789 for 5 years from the
date you file it.
Penalties.-Civil and criminal penalties
(up to $500,000) are provided for failure to
file a report or to supply information, and
for filing a false or fraudulent report. See 31
CFR, sections 103.47 and 103.49.

Definitions
Bank.-See 31 CFR 103.11 for the
definition of a bank.
Currency.-The coin and currency of the
United States or of any other country, which
circulate in and are customarily used and
accepted as money in the country in which
issued. It includes United States silver
certificates, United States notes, and
Federal Reserve notes, but does not include
bank checks or other negotiable
instruments not customarily accepted
as money.
Financial Institution.-Each agency,
branch, or office in the United States of any
person doing business in one or more of the
capacities listed below:
(1) a bank;
(2) a broker or dealer in securities,
registered or required to be registered
with SEC under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934;
(3) a person who engages as a business in
dealing in or exchanging currency (for
example, a dealer in foreign exchange
or a person engaged primarily in the
cashing of checks);

(4) a person who engages as a business in
issuing, selling, or redeeming traveler's
checks, money orders, or similar
instruments, except one who does so as
a selling agent exclusively, or as an
incidental part of another business;
(5) a licensed transmitter of funds, or other
person engaged in the business of
transmitting funds abroad for others.
Person.-An individual, corporation,
partnership, trust or estate, joint stock
company, association, syndicate, joint
venture, or other unincorporated
organization or group, and all entities
treated as legal personalities.
Transaction in Currency.-A transaction
involving the physical transfer of currency
from one person to another. A transaction in
currency does not include a transfer of
funds by means of bank check, bank draft,
wire transfer, or other written order that
does not include the physical transfer
of currency.

Specific Instructions
Amended report.-If this amends a
previously filed report, check the box in the
upper right corner. Staple a copy of the
previously filed report to this amended
report and complete only those entries
which you are correcting on the amended
report.
Part I-Identity of individual who
conducted the transaction.-This part
must always be completed. If the individual
conducts the transaction for another
person, be sure to complete Part II also.
Box I-Multiple individuals.-If two or
more individuals conduct a transaction,
check Box 1. All individuals must be
positively identified. Enter information in
Part I for one of the individuals. Complete
the entry spaces on the back of the form for
the other individuals. For example, a check
made out to John Doe and Thomas Smith
may be presented for payment at a financial
institution. Both of the joint payees are
present. Complete Part I on the front of the
form for John Doe, and complete Part I on
the back for Thomas Smith.
Items 2, 3, and 4-Name of person
conducting transaction.-Enter the
last name in Item 2, the first name in
Item 3, and the middle initial in Item 4.
Item 5-Social security number.-A
social security number must be provided
if an individual is conducting the
transaction for himself or herself. If the
individual is conducting a transaction for
another person or is a nonresident Shen
who does not have a social security
number, write NONE in the space and
complete Item 12.
Items 6,8, 9, 10, and 11-Address.Enter the permanent address, includingZIP
code, of the individual who entered the
financial institution to conduct the
transaction. A P.O. Box number is not a
street address.

Item 7-Occupation, profession, or
business.-Fully identify the
occupation, profession or business of
the individual conducting the
transaction; for example, secretary,
carpenter, attorney, etc, Do not use
nondescriptive terms such as merchant
self-employed, businessman, etc.
Item 12-Method used to verify
identity.-All individuals (except
employees of armored car services)
conducting a currency transaction for
themselves or for another person must I
positively identified For individuals whc
established customers, identifying
information previously obtained from th
customer and in the financial institutior
records may be provided Statements si
as "known customer" are not sufficient
identifying information For U S. citizen
ask to see and inspect a driver's permit
any other written identification docume
acceptable to the financial institution ir
normal check cashing operations Fora
alien, ask to see and inspect his or her
passport, alien ID card, or other official
document showing nationality or reside
Enter the type of document in Item a, s
as driver's license, sTgnature card, char
card, passport, etc. Enter in Item b. the
name of the state issuing the driver's
permit, the name of the bank or store
issuing the charge card, etc Enter the
number of the license, account, card, e
in Item c.
Item 13-Reason Items 2-12 not
completed; armored car service. mal
night deposit, or ATM transaction.Check Box a if the transaction was a
delivery by an armored car service licei
by a state or local government Enter tt
name of the armored car service in the
space provided.
Check Box b if the currency was
received or shipped through the U S F
Service.
Check Box c if the transaction was
night deposit or an ATM (automated te
machine) transaction.
Check Box d if this report involves
multiple transactions that when totalle
became a reportable transaction and t
individual(s) who conducted the
transactions cannot be identified.
If you check Box a, b. c, or d, you d
have to complete any other entries in I
However, be sure to complete Parts II,
IV, and V.
Part Il-Individual or organization f
whom transaction was completed.the individual in Part I is conducting tlt
transaction for himself or herself, do n
complete Part II. In all other cases,
including armored car service, mail, ni
deposit, or ATM transactions, complel
Part II.
Box 14-Multiple individuals or
organizations.-If this transaction is
conducted for more than one individu
organization, check Box 14, and com
the applicable entries on the back of t
form. Do this also if the individual in P
conducts a transaction that involves b
himself or herself and another individi
organization.
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; 15, 16. and 17-Name of
dual.-Enter the last name in Item
'st name in Item 16. and middle initial
n 17, of the individual for whom the
iction was completed.
18-Social security number.the social security number of the
iual for whom the transaction was
leted You will have this in your
Is If the individual is a nonresident
and does not have a social security
er, write NONE in the space for
imber
; 19 and 20-Organization's name
,IN.-If the transaction involves a
ess, show the business name in Item
and the employer identification
er (EIN) in Item 20. This isa 9-digit
er shown as 00-0000000. If the
ization does not have an EIN, write
- in Item 20
.ck Box 19b(1) if the individual or
ization is a broker or dealer in
ities Check Box 19b(2)if the
Jual or organization is a financial
ition described in item (3), (4), or (5)
, the Definitions of a Financial
ution on page 3
; 21, 23, 24, 25, and 26!ss.-Enter the permanent address
ring the ZIP code of the individual or
ization for whom the transaction is
leted in the appropriate boxes. If the
ss is outside the U S . be sure to show
iuntry in Item 26. A P 0. Box number
a street address,
22-Occupation, profession, or
ess.-Fully identify the occupation,
ssion, or business of the individual or
ization for whom the transaction was
leted Use descriptive terms, such as
ities broker, attorney, auto dealer,
Ionot use nondescriptive terms.
as self.employed, merchant,
essman, etc.
Il-Customer's account number
ted by the transaction.
17-Type of account and account
ier.-Check the boxes and enterthe
Intnumbers of the accounts affected
transaction If a deposit or
rawal is made from a savings,
ing. share, or other account, check
)propriate box and enter the account
er Other accounts would include all
ints with broker.dealers. If the
iction does not affect any account,
no entry in Part III For example, a
,rs check purchased with cash may
fect any account and does not require
itry in this part Please note that the
etters before the boxes are for IRS
ssing purposes
V-Type of transactlon.-Check
ixes that describe the transaction. For
ational transactions with foreign
:ial agencies (banks, currency
nge dealers, securities dealers, etc.)

involving receipts of currency for deposit,
purchases of currency, withdrawal,
shipments of currency for deposit, or sales
of currency, check the appropriate box
"Receipts from abroad" or "Shipments
abroad" in Item 29 or 30.
Box 28-Currency exchange.-Check
this box if currency was exchanged for
currency. This includes exchanging U.S.
currency for foreign currency (be sure to
complete Item 34) and vice versa. It also
includes exchanging small denomination
bills of U.S. currency for large
denomination bills of U.S. currency, or
vice versa.
Box 29-Cash in.-Check the appropriate
box(es) when currency is received by the
financial institution as part of a transaction.
Box 30-Cash out.-Check the
appropriate box(es) when the financial
institution pays out currency as part of a
transaction.
Item 31-Total amount of currency.Enter the total amount of currency in the
transaction. If a transaction involves both
currency and checks, such as a deposit
transaction, enter only the amount of the
currency.
Item 32-Amount in $100 bills or
higher.- Enter the amount of the total
currency transaction reported in Item 31
that is in denominations of U.S. currency of
$100 or higher. For example, if the total
currency transaction is $100,000 and
$50.000 is in U.S. currency of $100 or
higher denominations, enter $100,000 in
Item 31 and $50,000 in Item 32.
Item 33-Date.-Enter the month, day,
and year of the currency transaction. Use
the actual calendar date, not the banking
day date.
Item 34-Foreign currency.-If the
currency transaction involves a foreign
currency, enter the information in the
appropriate spaces. Enter the name of the
currency in Item b, the country in Item c,
and the total amount of the foreign currency
in U.S. dollars in Item d. Check the
appropriate box in Item a. if foreign
currency was exchanged for U.S. currency
or U.S. currency was exchanged for foreign
currency. For example, a currency
transaction involving Italian ira being
deposited would have lira entered in Item b,
Italy entered in Item c, and the amount,
converted into U.S. dollars, entered in Item
d. Since currency was not exchanged, no
entry is made in Item a. If currency of two or
more foreign countries is involved in the
transaction, attach a separate sheet of
paper that clearly identifies the individual or
organization for whom the transaction was
completed (Items 15 through 20) and report
the information for each foreign currency
required by Item 34.
Item 35-Check or wire transfer.-If
multiple checks-or wire transfers are
involved in the transaction, check Box a and
furnish the information for one of the
instruments on the front of the form and for
the other instruments on the back of the
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form in the spaces provided. If you have to
report more instruments than there are
entry spaces, attach a sheet of paper that
clearly identifies the individual or
organization for whom the transaction is
completed ( Items 15 through 20) and
furnish the information for Items bthrough f
for each check or wire transfer.
Date.-Enter the date shown on the check
or the wire transfer of funds in Item b.
Amount.-Enter the amount of the check
or wire transfer in Item c. Show the amount
in U.S. dollars only.
Payee.-Enter the name of the individual
or organization to whom the check or wire
transfer of funds is made payable in Item d.
Drawer.-Enter the name of the individual
or organization that wrote the check or who
wire transfered funds in Item e.
Drawee bank and MICR number.-Enter
the name of the bank and MICR number on
which the check or wire transfer of funds is
drawn in Item f.
Part V.-Financlal institution where
transaction took place.
Box 36-Type of financial Instituton.Check the box that describes the type of
financial institution you are.
Box 36a-Banks.-Enter the appropriate
code number for the Federal agency that
performs examinations for compliance with
the Bank Secrecy Act regulations:
Code 1-Comptroller of the Currency
Code 2-FDIC
Code 3-Federal Reserve System
Code 4-None of the above
Items 37, 39,41, 42,43. and 44Name, address, and MICR number.Enter the full legal name, street address,
city, State, ZIP code, and MICR number of
the financial institution where the
transaction occurred. If the transaction
occurred at a branch office, enter the
complete street address and MICR
number of the branch, not the
headquarter's address and MICR
number. A P.O. Box number is not a street
address. Enter the MICR number in Item
44.
Item 38-EIN.-Enter the financial
institution's employer identification number
(EIN).
Item 40-SSN.-If the financial
institution does not have an EIN, enter the
financial institution owner's social security
number.
Items 45, 46, 47, and 48-Preparer's
signature, title, and date.-Form 4789
must be signed in Item 45 by an individual
authorized or designated by the financial
institution to sign it. His or her title should
be shown in Item 46 and the date of
signature entered in Item 47. This signer's
name should be typed or printed legibly in
Item 48.
Items 49 and 50-Approving official's
signature and date.-The official who
reviews and approves the information on
the form must sign in Item 49 and enterthe
date of signing in Item 50.

